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Minnieh

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Dannieh

The 2018 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections:
What Do the Numbers Say?

North 2 Electoral District: Tripoli, Minnieh, and Dannieh

Georgia Dagher

Report

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The 2018 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections:
What Do the Numbers Say?

North 2 Electoral District: Tripoli, Minnieh, and Dannieh

Georgia Dagher

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Executive Summary

In the Lebanese parliamentary elections of 2018, the electoral district of North 2—which combined Tripoli, Minnieh, and Dannieh—saw a competitive race, with candidates from three electoral lists making it to parliament. Constituents were weakly mobilized in Tripoli, while they had much higher participation rates in Minnieh and Dannieh. However, in each district, there were variations across confessional groups: Sunni voters were significantly more likely to vote compared to others. Accordingly, within each of the minor districts, a higher share of Sunni voters was associated with higher turnout rates in a cadaster. In Tripoli, beyond the confessional composition of specific cadasters, voters in more homogeneous areas were significantly more likely to vote compared to those in more confessionally mixed areas. Three electoral lists won seats: One formed by the Future Movement, one formed by the Azm Movement, and one formed by Faisal Karami and independent candidates. The race was much more competitive in Tripoli, where the votes were highly contested between the Future Movement and Azm, followed by Dannieh, where the votes were contested between the Future Movement and Karami's list, while Minnieh was less competitive, with the Future Movement winning the majority of votes. In Tripoli, where seats were reserved for multiple confessional groups, an overwhelming majority of voters cast their preferential vote for a candidate from their own sect. In addition, while all confessional groups cast a substantial share of their votes for Sunni candidates, Alawite candidates barely won any votes from non-Alawite voters, while Greek Orthodox and Maronite candidates barely won any votes from non-Christian voters. Even voters who voted for one of the anti-establishment lists showed a bias toward their co-confessional candidates. Apart from this, geographical variations existed in the performance of anti-establishment lists: Voters in cadasters with lower levels of sectarian homogeneity, higher levels of economic development, and lower poverty rates were more likely to vote for one of the independent lists. Finally, the results of the votes in North 2 point toward irregularities, particularly in Tripoli, that benefited candidates on Karami's list and to some extent those on the Future Movement list. Both lists received significantly better results in polling stations that recorded very high turnouts, which could suggest voter or vote rigging. In addition, each of the lists' number of votes across polling stations were distributed in an irregular, non-uniform pattern, which could also suggest vote rigging.

Introduction

After passing a new electoral law in 2017, the Lebanese parliament finally agreed to hold elections in 2018—nine years after the previous ones, and two mandate extensions later. The new electoral law established a proportional representation system for the first time in the country’s history, paving the way for increased competition. This new system, however, led to little changes in political representation, with voters in 2018 reiterating their support for the main established political parties. Nevertheless, these results must not be taken at face value and require a closer analysis, as voting patterns across and within electoral districts, as well as across voters’ demographic characteristics, still showed variations.

As part of a larger study on the 2018 elections, LCPS has analyzed voter behavior at the national and the electoral district levels. Using the official elections results from polling stations published by the Ministry of Interior,¹ the analysis unpacks the elections results and examines differing patterns in voting behavior across demographic characteristics and geographical areas. The results at the polling station level were merged with a series of potential explanatory factors at the individual and cadastral levels. First, based on the ministry’s list of registered voters by confession and gender in each of the polling stations,² we identified the demographic characteristics of registered voters in each of the polling stations. The results at the polling station level were also merged with a series of factors that may have affected voters’ choices at the cadastral level in each electoral district. These factors include the level of economic development in a cadaster, approximated by the night-time light intensity;³ the poverty rate in a cadaster, approximated by the ratio of beneficiaries of the National Poverty Targeting Program over the population in the cadaster;⁴ the level of sectarian homogeneity in a cadaster, constructed by LCPS and based on the distribution of voters by confession in each cadaster;⁵ and, finally, the share of refugees over the number of registered voters in a cadaster.⁶ Through the use of multivariate regression analyses, the explanatory significance of each of these factors on voter behavior is identified.

Apart from voters’ preferences, the study also examines incidents of electoral fraud. We seek to identify evidence of voter rigging, such as vote buying, and vote rigging, such as ballot stuffing and vote counting manipulations.

This report unpacks the results in the electoral district of North 2, which consists of Tripoli, Dannieh, and Minnieh, and is allocated 11 parliamentary seats: Eight Sunni—five of them in Tripoli, two in Dannieh, and one in Minnieh—and one Alawite, one Greek Orthodox, and one Maronite seat—all in Tripoli. The report is divided into seven sections. First, we present the demographic distribution of registered

1 Available at: <http://elections.gov.lb>.

2 Note that some polling stations had voters from multiple confessional groups registered to vote. Similarly, some had both men and women registered to vote.

3 Obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

4 Data on National Poverty Targeting Program beneficiaries was obtained from the Ministry of Social Affairs.

5 Based on electoral data on the sect of voters per polling station, we constructed an index of homogeneity $(IH) = \sum_{i=1}^n S_{ij}^2$, where S_{ij}^2 is the sum of the square root of the shares of each sectarian group in the total number of registered voters in the cadaster. The index ranges between 0 (when the cadaster is fully heterogeneous) and 1 (when the cadaster is fully homogeneous, or only one sectarian group is present).

6 Data on the refugee population is collected from UNHCR.

voters in North 2. The second section analyzes voter turnout which varied across confessional groups and genders. The third section of this report delves into voters' preferences for political parties and candidates. Going beyond the results at the aggregate level, we shed light on the varying preferences for parties and candidates across voters' sect and gender and across geographical areas in North 2. In the fourth section, we examine voters' sectarian behavior, i.e. their preferences for candidates of their own sectarian group. The fifth section looks at the performance of women candidates. The sixth section examines the performance of the two independent lists that ran for elections in North 2, Kulluna Watani and the 'Independent Civil Society' list. The seventh and final section of this report identifies incidents of electoral fraud. Using a number of statistical methods—which include analyzing the distribution of results at the polling station level, such as turnouts, votes for each list and party, and the share of invalid ballots—we test for voter and vote rigging, such as pressure to vote through vote buying, or manipulations in the vote counting process.

I Who are the voters?


In the May 2018 Lebanese parliamentary elections, over 350,000 Lebanese were registered to vote in the electoral districts of Tripoli, Dannieh, and Minnieh (North 2). Among them, 349,236 were registered in Lebanon⁷ and 4,842 registered abroad. Out of the 128 parliamentary seats, there were 11 seats at stake in North 2. Tripoli has eight seats: Five Sunni, and one each for Greek Orthodox, Alawite, and Maronite voters; Dannieh has two Sunni seats; and Minnieh has one Sunni seat.

Compared to other electoral districts, North 2 has a low degree of confessional fragmentation. Sunnis are the largest group (83%), followed by Greek Orthodox and Alawites (6% each), and Maronites (4%), while the remaining 1% is split between Armenian Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Christian minorities, Shias, and Armenian Catholics.⁸

⁷ Including 1,433 public employees.

⁸ We calculate the number of registered voters by confession using the official election results published by the Ministry of Interior, as well as the ministry's list of registered voters by confession in each of the polling stations. Our approximation of the confessional composition of each district excludes public employees and diaspora voters, whose confessions were not specified.

Figure 1 Registered voters and allocated seats by confessional group in North 2



Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Given the confessional allocation of seats, representation is not the same for every voter, but rather depends on the confession to which they belong. In Tripoli, where more than one confessional group is represented, Maronite voters benefit more from the quota compared to others, while Sunni voters benefit the least. The Maronite seat in Tripoli represents about 5,000 voters, while each Sunni seat represents 38,400 Sunni voters. The Greek Orthodox and Alawite seats also represent a higher number of voters than the Maronite seat: The Greek Orthodox seat represents nearly 13,300 voters and the Alawite seat nearly 20,000.

Table 1 Confessional composition of North 2 and allocated seats by confessional group


	Tripoli				Dannieh			
	Number of voters	Percentage*	Number of seats	Voters per seat	Number of voters	Percentage*	Number of seats	Voters per seat
Sunni	191,999	82%	5	38,400	54,953	81%	2	27,477
Greek Orthodox	13,286	6%	1	13,286	5,430	8%		
Alawite	19,978	8%	1	19,978	12	0%		
Maronite	5,094	2%	1	5,094	7,601	11%		
Armenian Orthodox	1,581	1%						
Christian minorities	1,264	1%						
Greek Catholic	990	0%			7	0%		
Shia	797	0%			78	0%		
Armenian Catholic	346	0%						
Druze	10	0%						
Jewish	45	0%						
Total	235,390	100%			68,081	100%		
Public employees	695				572			
Diaspora	2,939				938			
Total	239,024				69,591			

	Minnieh			
	Number of voters	Percentage*	Number of seats	Voters per seat
Sunni	40,644	92%	1	40,644
Greek Orthodox	3,468	8%		
Alawite	8	0%		
Maronite	209	0%		
Armenian Orthodox				
Christian minorities				
Greek Catholic				
Shia	3	0%		
Armenian Catholic				
Druze				
Jewish				
Total	44,332	100%		
Public employees	166			
Diaspora	965			
Total	45,463			

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Registered voters tend to be divided into electoral centers depending on their confession and gender. The majority of voters in specific polling stations were Sunni (79%), 5% were Greek Orthodox and Alawite (each), 2% were Maronite. Nine percent of polling stations serviced voters from multiple confessional groups, representing over 30,000 voters, most of them in Tripoli.

Figure 2 Confessional composition of polling stations in North 2



Note Percentages have been rounded up.

In each minor district, a majority of Sunni voters were registered in their own polling stations. In Tripoli, most Greek Orthodox and Alawite voters were also registered in their own stations. However, only one-quarter of Maronite voters had their own polling stations, thus inhibiting a complete analysis of their voting behavior.

II Who voted?

The turnout rate in North 2 was significantly lower than the national average: 43% compared to the national average of 49%. Among the 354,078 Lebanese registered in the district, 151,759 cast a vote while the remaining 202,319 did not.


Turnout varied across minor districts. It was highest in Dannieh (51%), followed by Minnieh (49%), while it was much lower in Tripoli (39%). The North 2 districts also saw a drop in turnout compared to the 2009 elections. In 2009, 45% of voters in Tripoli and 56% of those in the previously merged Minnieh-Dannieh cast a ballot.

Similar to trends in other electoral districts, constituents in the diaspora—who were given the opportunity to vote for the first time in 2018—had a higher participation rate in the elections. In North 2, turnout among emigrants was 52%, compared to 43% among

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In total, 2,538 out of the 4,842 Lebanese voters who registered from abroad decided to vote.

residents.⁹ The variation was much larger in Tripoli, where 53% of emigrants voted, compared to 39% of residents. In Dannieh, nearly 55% of emigrants voted, compared to 51% of residents. In Minnieh, residents voted slightly more: 49% compared to 48% of emigrants.

Figure 3 Turnout by residency in North 2




Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Sunni voters were the most mobilized

Turnouts varied across confessional groups, but only slightly across genders. Overall, in all of the North 2 districts, Sunnis had a higher turnout than others.

In Tripoli, 41% of Sunni voters went to the polls, while less than 35% of all other groups did so. Alawite voters had the second-highest turnout (32%), followed by Greek Orthodox (26%), while turnout among Maronites was far lower (12%) despite them being represented by a seat in Tripoli. Armenian Orthodox voters, who had two polling stations reserved for them, had one of the lowest turnouts (16%), while turnout in mixed stations stood at 34%. The lower turnout in mixed stations could be partly due to the fact that these had a high share of Christian voters registered to vote, as well as other minority groups, compared to the share of Sunni voters. All these variations across confessional groups are statistically significant after controlling for voters' gender, as well as characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered, such as the level of confessional homogeneity, economic development, and poverty rates. Across genders, turnouts were slightly higher among men, or 40% compared to 39% among women. In gender-mixed stations, turnouts were much lower (32%). These lower turnout rates reflect those observed in stations that had multiple confessional groups registered to vote—as nearly all gender-mixed stations were also confessionally mixed (22 out of the 25 gender-mixed stations in Tripoli).


Figure 4 Turnout by confessional group and gender in Tripoli



Note Percentages have been rounded up.

In Dannieh, nearly 56% of Sunni voters cast a ballot. Other groups in Dannieh who voted in their own polling stations—Greek Orthodox and Maronites—had much lower turnouts, with 32% of Greek Orthodox and 26% of Maronite voters casting a ballot. Surprisingly, Greek Orthodox and Maronite voters in Dannieh had higher turnouts than they did in Tripoli, where they are represented by a seat. In mixed stations, where the majority of registered voters were Sunni and about one-third belong to both Christian groups, turnout stood at 45%. These variations across confessional groups are statistically significant, even after controlling for voters' gender, as well as characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered, such as level of confessional homogeneity, economic development, and poverty rates. Across genders, turnout did not significantly vary, and was only slightly higher in women-only polling stations, or 52% compared to 51% in men-only stations. In gender-mixed stations, however, turnouts were lower (47%), which was partly driven by the confessional composition of these. In addition, although the majority of gender-mixed stations had Sunni voters registered to vote, turnout in Sunni gender-mixed stations was much higher than turnout in gender-mixed stations that had other groups registered to vote.


Figure 5 Turnout by confessional group and gender in Dannieh



Note Percentages have been rounded up.

In Minnieh, across confessional groups, 50% of Sunni voters turned out to vote. Polling stations that had Greek Orthodox voters registered to vote saw a 36% turnout—higher than those in Tripoli. The few voters registered in mixed stations (about 3,000 voters), who were mostly Greek Orthodox, had a 38% turnout. These variations are also statistically significant. Across genders, there were also no significant variations, with turnout in women-only polling stations being slightly higher than it was in men-only polling stations (49% compared to 48%). Turnout was much higher in the few gender-mixed stations (nearly 56%). There were only five stations that had both genders registered to vote. Three of them were reserved for Sunnis and saw higher turnouts than the other two—one mixed and one Greek Orthodox.

Figure 6 Turnout by confessional group and gender in Minnieh



Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Geographical disparities in turnout were apparent—from below 30% to above 60% in some cadasters

Compared to other districts, overall turnout by cadaster in North 2 was low, as no cadaster reported a turnout above 65%.

In Tripoli, in contrast to Dannieh and Minnieh, turnout was below 50% in all cadasters. Across the 12 cadasters in Tripoli, El-Zahrieh saw the lowest turnout (29%), while Qalamoun saw the highest one (nearly 50%). The second-lowest turnout was reported in Al-Tall (35%). Turnout was also high in the neighborhoods of Wadi al-Nahle (72%) and in Beddawi (45%), both located in the cadaster of Tabbaneh. However, total turnout in the cadaster was lower (39%). There were no significant geographical variations, with turnouts in all other cadasters varying between 36% and 41%. All these variations were driven by the confessional composition of these cadasters and neighborhoods. A higher share of Christian and Alawite voters registered in a cadaster was associated with lower turnout rates, while a higher share of registered Sunnis was associated with higher turnout rates.

Dannieh saw the largest geographical variations, with turnouts varying from below 30% to above 60% across the 37 cadasters. The highest turnouts were reported in Harf El-Sayad, Ain El-Tineh, Kfar Bibnine, Izal, Tarane, and Nemrine (between 60% and 65% each). Reflecting the high turnout rates among Sunni voters, all of these cadasters are fully Sunni. Turnout was below 30% in three cadasters: It was lowest in Karm El-Mohr (16%), followed by Kahf El-Malloul and Aaymar (24% and 26%, respectively). All registered voters in these cadasters were Maronite, explaining the low turnouts.

Finally, in Minnieh, turnout was above 40% in all eight cadasters. The highest participation rate in Minnieh was reported in Rihaniyet-Miniyeh (68%), while Borj El-Yahoudiyeh, Nabi Youcheaa, and Deir Aamar all saw 55% turnouts. These four cadasters are fully Sunni, explaining the higher turnouts. Turnout was lowest in Terbol (41%), Markabta (45%), the cadaster of Minnieh (45%), and Bhannine (47%). The lower turnouts in most of these can be explained by the higher share of Greek Orthodox voters. Terbol is fully Greek Orthodox, Markabta nearly so (98%), and the cadaster of Minnieh has the third-highest share of registered Greek Orthodox voters. Bhannine, however, is nearly fully Sunni.

A higher share of Sunni voters registered to vote in a cadaster tended to be associated with higher turnouts

Geographical variations in turnouts were driven by both inter- and intra-sect differences. In Tripoli, all cadasters that had turnouts above 40% are nearly fully, if not fully Sunni, with the exception of Hadid, which saw a 38% turnout. In all other cadasters where turnouts were

below 40%, Sunnis constituted less than 70% of registered voters, and most often, less than 50%. These cadasters had a higher share of Greek Orthodox, Maronite, and Alawite voters. Moreover, in the lowest turnout cadasters, such as El-Zahrieh (29%), Al-Tall (35%), and El-Remmaneh (36%), turnouts in Sunni polling stations were higher than the average at the cadaster level (37% in El-Zahrieh, 39% in Al-Tall, and 38% in El-Remmaneh). In the cadaster of Tabbaneh, where overall turnout was 39%, there were significant variations across neighborhoods. Tabbaneh is the cadaster with the highest share of Alawite voters registered, however, the two neighborhoods of Wadi al-Nahle and Beddawi, which did not have any Alawite voters, had much higher turnouts. The turnout rate in Wadi al-Nahle—where nearly all registered voters were Sunni, with a share of Shias (10% of registered voters)—was significantly higher (72%), and that in Beddawi—where all voters were Sunni—was also comparatively high (45%).

In Dannieh, all cadasters with the lowest turnouts, Karm El-Mohr, Aaymar, and Kahf El-Malloul, only had Maronite voters registered to vote. Similar to Tripoli, all registered voters in the cadasters with the highest turnouts were Sunni. On average, turnout by cadaster tended to decrease as the share of registered Sunni voters decreased. For example, on average, turnouts in cadasters where over 80% of registered voters were Sunni were as high as 55%, while when less than 80% of registered voters were Sunni, turnouts, on average, were below 40%.


As noted previously, out of the eight cadasters in Minnieh, the three with the lowest turnouts had a higher prevalence of Greek Orthodox voters, while all of those with the highest turnouts (over 50%) are fully Sunni. The two lowest turnout cadasters, Terbol and Markabta, are fully Greek Orthodox, while the third, the cadaster of Minnieh, is the only other one to have a substantial share of registered Greek Orthodox voters. There is one exception, however, as the fourth lowest turnout cadaster, Bhannine, is fully Sunni (47% turnout).

Beyond the prevalence of a specific confessional group, turnout was largely affected by the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster, specifically, whether there is a high predominance of a confessional group in a cadaster, regardless of which, or whether many different confessional groups cohabit in a cadaster. The more homogenous the cadaster is, the higher the participation rate in the elections.¹⁰ In North 2, average turnouts by cadaster increased from 37% in the most heterogeneous cadasters to 47% in the most homogeneous ones. This relationship is statistically significant, even after controlling for voters' confession and gender, as well as other characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered, such as level of economic development and poverty rates.

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
We use an index of confessional homogeneity $(IH) = \sum_{i=1}^n S_{ij}^2$, where S_{ij}^2 is the sum of the square root of the share of each sectarian group in the total number of registered voters in a cadaster. The index goes from 0.3 (when the cadaster is fully heterogeneous) and 1 (when the cadaster is fully homogenous, or only one sectarian group is present).

Figure 7 Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and turnout rate in North 2



The level of homogeneity was significant only in Tripoli, which has a higher share of heterogeneous cadasters, while Dannieh and Minnieh are much more homogeneous. In Minnieh, in all cadasters but one, a single confessional group represented over 90% of registered voters, and in Dannieh, in all cadasters but five, one confessional group represented at least 60% of registered voters. In Tripoli, average turnouts increased from 36% in the most heterogeneous cadasters, to nearly 42% in the most homogeneous ones.

Figure 8 Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and turnout rate in Tripoli




What are the main drivers of turnout in North 2?

As noted previously, in Tripoli, voters registered in cadasters with higher levels of confessional homogeneity tended to vote more. Moreover, voters registered in cadasters with lower levels of economic development, just as those in cadasters with higher poverty rates, were more likely to vote. This result could point toward voter rigging and may suggest that political parties are more capable of mobilizing constituents in poorer areas by offering benefits, or compensation in exchange of votes. No cadaster-level factor had an effect on turnouts in Dannieh and Minnieh.


At the polling station level, voters in homogeneous polling stations tended to vote more than those in mixed stations. Moreover, smaller polling stations—those with a smaller number of registered voters—also tended to see higher turnouts. This was the case in both Tripoli and Dannieh, while in Minnieh only the former factor was significant. Both these relationships could also point toward voter rigging. As a smaller number of voters in a station—who are also easily identifiable given the different types of polling stations—facilitates the monitoring of their behavior, politicians may have more incentive to mobilize those voters. Across confessional groups, even after controlling for all geographical factors, Sunnis were more likely to vote than others in all three districts. In Tripoli, they were followed by Alawite and Greek Orthodox voters, while Maronite and the few Armenian Orthodox voters were the least likely to vote. In Dannieh, Maronites were again the least likely to vote, while Greek Orthodox voters stood in between.

Figure 9 Drivers of turnouts in North 2


a Drivers of turnouts in Tripoli



b Drivers of turnouts in Dannieh



c Drivers of turnouts in Minnieh



III Who voted for whom?

Eight lists and a total of 75 candidates competed in North 2. There were 53 candidates in Tripoli, where 31 competed for five Sunni seats, eight competed for the Alawite seat, eight for the Greek Orthodox seat, and six for the Maronite seat. In Dannieh, 14 candidates competed for the two Sunni seats, and in Minnieh, eight candidates competed for the Sunni seat.

The race was competitive, and three of the eight competing lists won seats in North 2

The 'Future for the North' list, formed by the Future Movement (FM), obtained five seats with 36% of the vote (51,937 votes). The party won three Sunni seats in Tripoli, which went to Mohammad Kabbara

¹¹ Following an appeal from Taha Naji, an unsuccessful candidate running on Faisal Karami's list who lost by a single vote, the Constitutional Council unseated Dima Jamali on February 2, 2019 and by-elections were held on April 14, 2019. With the backing of prime minister Saad Hariri, as well as the main political figures in Tripoli, former prime minister Najib Mikati and former ministers Mohammad Safadi and Ashraf Rifi (both supporting or running on other lists in 2018), Jamali won her seat back with 19,387 votes.

(9,600 votes), Samir Jisr (9,527 votes), and Dima Jamali¹¹ (2,066 votes). In Dannieh, the party won one of the seats, obtained by Sami Fatfat (7,943 votes), and in Minnieh, it won the only seat, which went to Osman Alameddine (10,221 votes).

The second winning list was 'The Determination', formed by the Azm Movement. With 29% of the votes (42,019 votes), the list won four seats, all in Tripoli. The list won one Sunni seat, which went to Najib Mikati (21,300 votes), and all the non-Sunni seats. The Alawite seat was won by Ali Darwish (2,246 votes), the Maronite seat by Jean Obeid (backed by the party, 1,136 votes), and the Greek Orthodox seat by Nicolas Nahas (1,057 votes).

Finally, the third winning list, 'National Dignity', formed by the Arab Liberation Party, obtained the two remaining seats with 20% of the vote (29,101 votes). Faisal Karami (7,126 votes) won the last Sunni seat in Tripoli, and Jihad Al-Samad (independent, 11,897 votes) the second seat in Dannieh.


All of the winners, except one, were either former politicians, or had strong political connections. Mohammad Kabbara has held his seat in Tripoli since 1992, and Samir Jisr since 2005. Both have also served as ministers, with Kabbara being the caretaker Minister of Labor at the time of the elections, while Jisr was Minister of Justice from 2000 to 2003, and Minister of Education from 2003 to 2004. Sami Fatfat and Osman Alameddine, although they were neither former MPs nor ministers, both belong to a political family. Fatfat inherited his father's seat: He is the son of Ahmad Fatfat, who held a seat in parliament from 1996 to 2009 and served as a Minister of Youth and Sports and interim Interior Minister. Osman Alameddine is also the son of former MP Mohammad Alameddine, and inherited his brother's seat (Hashem Alameddine). While Dima Jamali's connections are weaker, she is the daughter of former mayor of Tripoli Rashid Jamali.

On the second winning list, Najib Mikati had previously served as Prime Minister, as well as in other ministries. He has been an MP in Tripoli since the 2000 elections, and is the head of the Azm party. Jean Obeid is also a former MP and minister, and represented Tripoli in parliament from 1992 to 2005; he also served in various ministries from 1993 to 2003. Nicolas Nahas is a former Minister of Economy and Trade (2011).

Finally, among the winners on the third victorious list, Faisal Karami is a member of one of the biggest political families in Tripoli. He is the former Minister of Youth and Sports (2011-2014), and is the grandson of Abdul Hamid Karami, son of Omar Karami, and nephew of Rashid Karami—all former Prime Ministers. He also inherited his father's cousin's, Ahmad Karami's seat. Finally, Jihad Al-Samad is also a former MP.

The four other lists that ran in North 2 were ‘Lebanon the Sovereign’, headed by Ashraf Rifi, former Minister of Justice (2014-2016), which won nearly 7% of the vote (9,656 votes); ‘Independent Decision’, backed by Jama’a al-Islamiyah, which won 3% (4,184 votes); ‘People’s Decision’, backed by the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), which won 3% (4,122 votes); Kulluna Watani, a coalition between independent groups, which won 2% (2,680 votes); and the ‘Independent Civil Society’ list, which won 0.3% (448 votes).

Figure 10 Percentage of votes for each list in North 2



Note Percentages have been rounded up.

There were large variations in the success of each list across minor districts.


The race was more competitive in Tripoli, where Azm ranked first (34%), but was closely followed by the FM list (30%). Overall in North 2, the Azm list was more successful in Tripoli than it was in the two other minor districts, while the FM list was less successful in Tripoli than it was in the two other districts. Karami's list came in third in Tripoli (18%), while Ashraf Rifi's list (9%) and the one backed by Jama'a al-Islamiyah followed (4%). The latter two performed much better in Tripoli than they did in the other districts.

In Dannieh, the FM list won the highest share of votes (43%), and was followed by Karami's list (35%), which performed much better in Dannieh than it did in the two other districts. The Azm list received its lowest share of votes in Dannieh (13%).

There was much less competition in Minnieh. The FM list won nearly half of the vote (49%), and was followed by Azm (33%), while Karami's list received few votes (3%). The list backed by the FPM came

in third with 11%, compared to less than 2% of votes it received in the other districts.

Figure 11 Percentage of votes for each list by minor district in North 2



Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Variations in the performance of each list across minor districts were driven by which candidates were running in each of the districts.

The success of the Azm list in Tripoli was driven by the popularity of Najib Mikati, who won 25% of preferential votes in the district. Over half of the votes received by the Azm list in North 2 were won by Mikati alone. Among the other candidates on the list in Tripoli, Alawite winner Ali Darwish came in second (3%), while the two other winners from the list, Jean Obeid and Nicolas Nahas, only won 1% each. One candidate on their list performed better, Mohammad Jisr (2%, 1,477 votes).

The FM list performed best in Minnieh, with its winner Osman Alameddine receiving 50% of preferential votes, and nearly 20% more than the second-ranking candidate in the district, Kazem Kheir from the Azm list (33%, 6,754 votes). In Dannieh, both candidates on the FM list found high levels of support. Winner Sami Fatfat ranked second in the district (24% of preferential votes), and Qassem Abdel Aziz ranked third (20%, 6,382 votes). In Tripoli, where the FM list received its lowest share of votes, the candidates Mohammad Kabbara and Samir Jisr won 11% of preferential votes each. Winner Dima Jamali followed (2%), although she was less successful than some losing candidates in Tripoli. The five other candidates on the list in

Tripoli won 5% of preferential votes combined, with Chadi Nachabe, Walid Sawalhi, Georges Bkassini, Nehme Mahfoud, and Layla Chahoud each winning between 0.5% and 1.3%.

Karami's list's much higher success in Dannieh was driven by support for Jihad Al-Samad who won 36% of preferential votes, or over 10% more than the second winner, Sami Fatfat. Around 40% of the votes obtained by Al-Samad's list in North 2 were cast for him. In Tripoli, Faisal Karami ranked fourth with 8% of preferential votes. Taha Naji won 5% (4,152 votes) and performed better than four of the winners in Tripoli. Two other candidates who received some votes were Ahmad Omran who ran for the Alawite seat (2,794 votes, 3%) and the single candidate from Marada, Rafli Diab, who ran for the Greek Orthodox seat (1,286 votes, 2%).

Among the other lists, Ashraf Rifi's performed better in Tripoli, driven by support for Rifi, the head of the list (5,931 preferential votes, 7%), who received well over half of the votes that went to his list in North 2. Similarly, the Jama'a-backed list's better performance in Tripoli was driven by the success of the Jama'a candidate Wasim Alwan (2,000 votes, 2%), who won nearly half of the votes that went to his list in North 2. By contrast, the FPM-backed list received a higher share of votes in Minnieh, where its candidate Kamal Kheir ranked third (2,182 preferential votes, 11%), and also received over half of the preferential votes that went to his list in North 2. The single FPM candidate, Tony Marouni who ran for the Maronite seat in Tripoli, only received 0.8% of preferential votes in the district (675 votes).


The diaspora's vote diverged from that of residents in North 2

The performance of lists and candidates varied across residencies.¹² In particular, compared to residents, emigrants voted much more for Karami's list (9% more), the FPM-backed one (4% more), and Kulluna Watani (4% more), which translated into a much lower share of votes for the Azm (13% less) and FM lists (7% less). By candidate, emigrants registered in Tripoli voted significantly more for Taha Naji, who ranked first among them (25% of their preferential votes, 20% higher than that among resident voters). Emigrants voted much less for Najib Mikati (17% lower among emigrants), and slightly less for Mohammad Kabbara and Faisal Karami (5% lower each). In Dannieh, emigrants voted much less for Sami Fatfat (whose votes among emigrants were 14% lower than they were among residents) and Qassem Abdel Aziz (4% lower). They voted more for Jihad Al-Samad (5% higher), and Jihad Youssef on the Azm list (5% higher) and Dani Osman from Kulluna Watani (3% higher), both of whom won less than 1% of preferential votes among residents. Finally, in Minnieh, compared to residents, emigrants gave a higher share of their preferential votes to Adel Zreika on Karami's list (5% higher) and Kamal Kheir (3% higher),

¹² 2,489 emigrants voted for a list, and 2,300 cast a preferential vote.

while they gave a lower share to Kazem Kheir (6% lower) and Osman Alameddine (3% lower).

Figure 12 Percentage of votes for each list by residency in North 2



The process of seat allocation—after ballots were counted—determined who made it to parliament

Under the proportional representation system, combined with the option to cast a preferential vote, the sectarian allocation of seats, and the introduction of high electoral thresholds, candidates who receive the highest number of preferential votes do not necessarily win. Were seats obtained by the most successful candidates representing each sectarian group, regardless of list, Ashraf Rifi would have won a Sunni seat in Tripoli instead of Dima Jamali (FM). While Jamali won her seat with 2,066 preferential votes, Rifi lost despite receiving over twice as many votes, or 5,931 in total. With the electoral threshold or quotient—i.e. the minimum number of votes a list must receive in order to win a seat—in North 2 set at 9.1% of votes, Rifi's list fell short of nearly 3,700 votes to win a seat.¹³

Even the process of seat allocation under the proportional representation system—i.e. the selection of candidates from each winning list that make it to parliament—created competition across and within lists: Candidates were competing not just against those on opposing lists, but also against candidates on their own lists. This means that significant weight was given to the preferential vote, rather than the list or party vote.

The process of seat allocation in the 2018 elections followed a 'vertical' distribution. Once the results were counted and the number of seats obtained by each list determined, all candidates from the winning lists in the electoral district were ranked from highest to lowest, regardless of list. The most voted for candidate then won their seat, regardless of the list to which they belonged. Accordingly, the list to which this candidate belonged then had one less seat left to win. In North 2, Najib Mikati ranked first (Tripoli, Azm, Sunni),

¹³ The electoral quotient is calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of seats in a district. In North 2, where the number of valid votes was 146,419, the quotient was equal to 13,311 votes, or 9.1%.

thus winning his seat. This means that the Azm list, which won four seats in North 2, had three remaining seats to obtain. In addition, with the sectarian distribution of seats, and the number of seats allocated to each of the three minor districts in North 2, four of the five Sunni seats in Tripoli would be left to fill. All seats are allocated following the same method, i.e. based on rank, but constrained by the number of seats allocated to each sect, the number of seats in each of the sub-districts (Tripoli, Dannieh, and Minnieh), and the number of seats won by each list. This process of distributing seats was not specified in the electoral law, meaning the method was actively selected and that an alternative one could have been used. The vertical distribution of seats prioritized the preferential vote—i.e. the candidate—over the proportional vote, which would be the support for a party or list. Indeed, the Azm list won a lower number of votes than the FM one in North 2, but was the first one to win a seat.

Another process of seat allocation that could have been followed under the same electoral law is a ‘horizontal’ distribution of seats. Under such a distribution, candidates within each list—rather than across all lists—are ranked, with seats won by the most successful candidates on each winning list, but again constrained by the sectarian quota and the number of seats in each of the sub-districts. The first seat would then go to the most successful candidate from the first winning list. In North 2, that would be Osman Alameddine from the FM list in Minnieh. The second winner would be the most successful candidate from the second winning list: Najib Mikati in Tripoli. The third would be the most successful candidate from the third winning list: Jihad Al-Samad (Karami’s list) in Dannieh. The fourth seat would then go to the second-ranking candidate on the FM list; with the remaining seats being distributed following the same method. While all of these three candidates won, the results would change further down the lists.

Had seats been allocated in this way in the 2018 elections, two of the winners would change. First, Nicolas Nahas (Azm list), who won the Greek Orthodox seat in Tripoli, would lose to Nehme Mahfoud, who ran on the FM list. Second, Sami Fatfat in Dannieh (FM list) would lose to Mohammad Fadel (Azm list).

There were no large variations in voters’ preferences for political parties and lists across genders


Compared to male voters, women voted slightly more for the FM list (4% more) and the Azm list (2% more), while they voted less for Karami’s list (3% less) and Rifi’s list (2% less). When controlling for certain characteristics of the cadasters in which voters were registered, such as level of economic development and confessional homogeneity, as well as voters’ confession, women were more likely to

vote for the FM list, while men were more likely to vote for Karami's and Ashraf Rifi's list. There was no significant variation in support for the Azm list.

Women showed stronger support for most candidates on the FM list, and in particular those in Dannieh: Sami Fatfat and Qassem Abdel Aziz (whose preferential votes, combined, were 6% higher among women than they were among men). Women also gave a higher share of their preferential votes to Dima Jamali, Samir Jisr, and Osman Alameddine. Women's higher level of support for the Azm list was mostly driven by the higher share of votes they gave to Najib Mikati (2% more) and Kazem Kheir (1% more).

Compared to men, women voted much less for Jihad Al-Samad (6% less), Ashraf Rifi (3% less), Kamal Kheir (2% less, FPM-backed list), and Faisal Karami (1% less).

Figure 13 Percentage of votes for each list by gender in North 2




Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Preferences for lists, parties, and candidates significantly varied across confessional groups

Overall, in North 2, Sunnis gave the highest share of their vote to the FM list (39%) and were more likely to vote for the list compared to other confessional groups, even after controlling for gender and certain characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered. The FM list was less successful among Maronite and Alawite voters (less than 15% of their votes), who were overall less likely to vote for the list compared to other groups. Sunnis also gave a high share of votes to the Azm list (29%), but a much lower one to Karami's list compared to other confessional groups (18%). The highest share of votes received by Ashraf Rifi's list was also among Sunnis, who were more likely to vote for the list compared to other groups (7%). Among Alawite and Maronite voters, Karami's list received a near majority of votes (47% and 46%, respectively). These two confessional

groups were overall the most likely to vote for this list, even after controlling for other factors. The second list among Alawite voters was Azm (36%), which performed best among this group. Alawites were also the most likely to vote for this list, even after controlling for other factors. The list that included the FPM was significantly more successful among Christian voters, who were overall the most likely to vote for the list, with 12% of Greek Orthodox and 9% of Maronite voters casting their ballot for it.

Figure 14 Percentage of votes for each list by confessional group in North 2



Note Percentages have been rounded up.

In Tripoli, there were significant variations in the success of each candidate across confessional groups.

The Sunni vote was contested between the Azm and FM lists (35% and 33%), while Karami’s list won the third highest share (16%), followed by Rifi’s list, which was much more successful among Sunni voters than it was among other groups (10%). Six candidates managed to win over 5% of Sunni voters’ preferential vote in Tripoli, representing overall over three-quarters of their votes. Najib Mikati won over one-quarter of the Sunni preferential vote (28%). He was followed by Mohammad Kabbara and Samir Jisr (13% each). Faisal Karami ranked fourth (9%), closely followed by Ashraf Rifi (8%), while the last candidate who managed to win 5% of the Sunni preferential vote was Taha Naji, who ran on Karami’s list (5%). All six of these candidates were significantly more successful among Sunni voters than they were among other groups, with each winning over 90% of their votes from voters in Sunni polling stations.

Ten other candidates managed to win over 1% of the Sunni preferential vote, with the most successful ones being Dima Jamali (FM), Wassim Alwan (Jama’a al-Islamiyah), and Mohammad Jisr (Azm)

list) (between 2% and 3% each). Apart from the four main lists, the Jama'a-backed list won 4% of the Sunni vote in Tripoli, Kulluna Watani 2%, the FPM-backed list 0.6%, and the Independent Civil Society won 0.4%.


Among Alawite voters, Karami's list won nearly the majority of the votes (47%), with most of the remaining going to the Azm list (36%). Overall, eight candidates managed to win over 1% of the Alawite preferential vote each. Nearly 41% of Alawites chose Ahmad Omran (Karami's list), and 30% chose Alawite winner Ali Darwish. Both of these candidates received less than 1% of every other confessional group's votes. Layla Chahoud (FM list) and Najib Mikati both won 5% of the Alawite preferential vote, while Badr Eid (Rifi's list), Faisal Karami, and Mahmoud Chehade (FPM-backed list) each won 4%, and Taha Naji was the last one to win 1%. Among lists, apart from Karami's and Azm's, the FM one won 7% of the Alawite vote, and was followed by Rifi's and the FPM-backed one (4% each). The Jama'a-backed list, Kulluna Watani, and the Independent Civil Society list obtained only between 0.4% and 0.8% of the Alawite vote.

The Greek Orthodox vote in Tripoli was highly fragmented, with the two most successful lists, Karami's and Azm, winning an equal share (27% and 26%). The FM list came in third (17%), while the remainder of the Greek Orthodox vote was divided between Kulluna Watani (13%) and the FPM-backed list (11%). Seventeen candidates managed to win over 1% of the Greek Orthodox preferential vote. The most successful candidate was Rafli Diab from Marada (25%), who was followed by Nicolas Nahas (19%). Other candidates who won over 5% of the Greek Orthodox vote were Tony Marouni (FPM-backed list, 10%), Nehme Mahfoud (8%, FM list), Farah Issa (6%, Kulluna Watani), and Yahya Mawloud (5%, Kulluna Watani). Among the other lists, Rifi's was the most successful (3%), and was followed by the Jama'a-backed list (2%), while the Independent Civil Society list won 0.6%.

The vote in Maronite polling stations was even more fragmented than that in Greek Orthodox ones. Karami's list, the FPM-backed list, and Azm each received between 23% and 24% of the Maronite vote; while the FM list received 14% and Kulluna Watani 12%. Fourteen candidates won over 1% of the Maronite preferential vote. One fourth of Maronite voters voted for Tony Marouni (25%), who was followed by Rafli Diab (19%). Nicolas Nahas came in third (13%), followed by Mohammad Kabbara (7%) and Jean Obeid (6%). Regarding other lists, Rifi's won 2%, followed by the Independent Civil Society list (1.4%) and the Jama'a-backed list (0.8%).

Armenian Orthodox voters, who are not represented by a seat, gave nearly half of their preferential vote to Nicolas Nahas (45%). Other candidates who won over 5% were Jean Obeid (11%), Tony Marouni (10%), Rafli Diab (7%), and Nehme Mahfoud (5%).

Figure 15 Main candidates by confessional group in Tripoli



Note Percentages have been rounded up.


In Dannieh, where only Sunnis are represented by a seat, a near majority of their vote went to the FM list (47%) and over one-third went to Karami’s (35%). The candidate on the latter list, winner Jihad Al-Samad, ranked first with 36% of the Sunni preferential vote. He was followed by the second winner Sami Fatfat (FM, 26%). Qassem Abdel Aziz, the second candidate on the FM list, came in third among Sunni voters (21%), while Mohammad Fadel on the Azm list followed (10%). No other candidate in Dannieh managed to win over 2% of the Sunni preferential vote. The Rifi-backed list ranked fourth (4%), followed by the Jama’a-backed list (1.6%), the FPM-backed list (1%), Kulluna Watani (0.7%), and the Independent Civil Society list (only 0.1%).

Greek Orthodox and Maronite voters, who also had their own polling stations, voted similarly. Karami’s list received the highest share of their votes (43% of the Greek Orthodox and 49% of the Maronite vote), followed by the Azm list (26% and 27%), and the FM list (16% and 12%). By candidate, Jihad Al-Samad ranked first among both groups, receiving 45% of the Greek Orthodox and 52% of the Maronite preferential vote. Al-Samad was followed by Mohammad Fadel, who won over one-quarter of each group’s preferential votes (27% of the Greek Orthodox and 28% of the Maronite vote). Sami Fatfat and Qassem Abdel Aziz followed, with the former winning 7% of Greek Orthodox and 9% of Maronite preferential votes; and the latter winning 9% of Greek Orthodox and 4% of Maronite preferential votes.

Regarding the other lists, Greek Orthodox voters gave between 3% and 4% of their votes to each of the FPM-backed, Jama’a-backed,

Rifi-backed, and Kulluna Watani lists, while they gave 0.4% to the Independent Civil Society list. Maronite voters gave a much higher share to the FPM-backed list (7%), and between 1% and 3% to the Rifi-backed, Kulluna Watani, and Jama'a-backed lists, with the Independent Civil Society list winning only 0.3%.


Figure 16 Main candidates by confessional group in Dannieh



Note Percentages have been rounded up.

In Minnieh, the majority of Sunni preferential votes went to winner Osman Alameddine (52%). Kazem Kheir on the Azm list followed (34%), while most of the remainder went to Kamal Kheir on the FPM-backed list (9%). Kamal Kheir was the most successful candidate among Greek Orthodox voters (37%), who also had their own polling stations in Minnieh. He was closely followed by Kazem Kheir (33%), while Osman Alameddine was much less successful (23%). Regarding the other lists, Karami's, followed by Rifi's, and the Jama'a-backed list won between 1.5% and 3% of the Sunni vote each, while Kulluna Watani and the Independent Civil Society list won only 0.2% and 0.1%, respectively. Among Greek Orthodox voters, Karami's list was also more successful (4%), but was closely followed by Kulluna Watani (3%), and Rifi's list (2%). The Jama'a-backed and the Independent Civil Society lists won 0.6% and 0.2%, respectively.

Figure 17 Main candidates by confessional group in Minnieh



Note Percentages have been rounded up.

There were large variations in the success of each list across cadasters and neighborhoods

Generally, the FM list in Tripoli (where it won 30% of votes) was most successful in Beddawi (40% of votes)—although it was closely followed by the Azm list—and least successful in Wadi al-Nahle (19%), where the Azm list was most successful. The FM list tended to win between 25% and 35% of votes in most other neighborhoods in Tripoli. In Dannieh, where it won 43% of votes, the FM list won over 70% of votes in Hazmiyet (72%) and Qemmamine (71%). It also won the majority in Qarsaita (67%), Qarhaiya (60%), Nemrine (54%), Debaael (53%), Azqey (52%), as well as Beit Haouik (50%). Finally, in Minnieh, the FM list, which won half of the votes in the district, won the highest share in Rihaniyet-Miniyeh (63%), while it also only won the majority in Bhannine (54%) and Nabi Youcheaa (50%). The list received slightly less than 7% of votes in Terbol, where most of the votes went to the Azm list. The FM list also received a relatively low share (20%) in Borj El-Yahoudiyeh.

Regarding the Azm list in Tripoli (where it won 34% of votes), it obtained a high share of votes in Wadi al-Nahle (67%), while it was less successful in Qalamoun (22%), but received between 30% and 40% in all other neighborhoods of Tripoli. Azm was much less successful in Dannieh than it was in the other two districts (winning 13%). It nevertheless managed to win 67% in Haoura, where each of the two other winning lists won less than 15%, and 44% of votes in Deir Nbouh, where it beat the other two winning lists by a significant margin. In Minnieh, where the Azm list won the second-highest share of votes (33%), it won 78% of votes in Terbol, and 67% in Borj El-Yahoudiyeh, the two cadasters the FM list was least successful in. The Azm list won 30% of votes or more in all cadasters except Rihaniyet-Miniyeh (22%).

Karami's list, which was less successful than the two other winning lists in North 2, won between 10% and 20% of votes in most

neighborhoods of Tripoli, where it overall won 18% of votes. The highest share it won was in Tabbaneh (26%), while the lowest was in Wadi al-Nahle (6%) followed by Qalamoun (10%). In Dannieh, Karami's list, which was more successful than it was in other districts (35% of votes), won nearly all of the votes in Zghartighrine (96%). Karami's list also won 75% of votes in Kharnoub, and 69% of votes in Harf Es-Sayad, and over half of the votes in Bakhaoun (56%) and Aaymar (52%), beating all other lists by a large margin. Finally, in Minnieh, the list won only 3% of the votes overall. It nevertheless managed to win 14% in Rihaniyet-Miniyeh, with its second-highest share being only 7% in Markabta.

Among the other smaller lists, Ashraf Rifi's, which was much more successful in Tripoli than in the other two districts (9% of votes), won over 10% of votes only in El-Souayqa (12%), while it only managed to win between 5% and 10% in all other neighborhoods of the district. In Dannieh, the list, which won 4% of votes overall, received 28% in Izal, only slightly less than the two winning lists in the district (34% for the FM list and 29% for Karami's). The list won 10% of votes or less in all other cadasters, and managed to win over 5% in Deir Nbouh (9%), Kahf El-Malloul, Kfar Habou, and Sir El-Danniyeh (between 6% and 8%). Finally, in Minnieh (where the list won 2%), it won less than 3% of votes in all cadasters but Nabi Youcheaa (3%).

The list backed by Jama'a al-Islamiyah, which was also more successful in Tripoli than it was in the other minor districts (nearly 4% of votes), won less than 5% of votes in all neighborhoods but Qalamoun. There, the list won 24% of votes, performing better than all other lists but the FM. The Jama'a-backed list in Dannieh, which won less than 2% of votes, managed to win over 5% of votes in Kfar Chellane (9%), Tarane (8%), and Kfar Habou (6%). In Minnieh, where the list won barely over 1% of votes, the highest share it managed to obtain was only 4% in Deir Aamar, while it won less than 0.5% of votes in all other cadasters.

Finally, the last of the party-affiliated lists in North 2, the one which included the FPM candidate, won less than 5% of votes in all neighborhoods of Tripoli (where it overall won slightly over 1% of votes). The highest share of votes it was able to obtain was in El-Zahrieh (5%) and Mina (4%), driven by the higher share of Christian voters registered in these neighborhoods. In Dannieh, the FPM-backed list (2% of votes), won 15% of the votes in Behouaita, performing significantly better than the FM list, which barely received any votes (3%), although Karami's list and Azm received a much higher share. The FPM-backed list also won 15% in Kahf El-Malloul, and slightly over 10% in Aaymar and Qarne. Finally, in Minnieh, the list was significantly more successful than it was in the other districts, winning 11% of votes. The highest share it received was 29% of votes

in Markabta, performing slightly better than the FM list and almost as well as the Azm list. Its second-highest share, however, was 14% in the cadaster of Minnieh, while it won less than 10% of votes in all other cadasters.

Beyond the percentage of votes received by each list, candidates relied on preferential votes in specific neighborhoods

Regarding each candidate in Tripoli, most obtained the largest share of their preferential votes from voters in Tabbaneh, El-Haddadine, and Mina, where at least 12,000 preferential votes were cast. Among the winners in Tripoli, Mohammad Kabbara managed to win over 1,000 preferential votes in Tabbaneh (2,000 preferential votes), El-Haddadine (1,703 votes) and Mina (1,336 votes). The second-most successful candidate, Samir Jisr, also won over 1,000 preferential votes in these three neighborhoods, with his highest share being in Tabbaneh (1,676 votes), followed by Mina (1,492 votes), where he won a slightly higher number of votes than Kabbara, and El-Haddadine (1,314 votes). In most neighborhoods, Kabbara won more preferential votes than Jisr, however the latter received a much higher share in Beddawi (606 preferential votes, compared to 354 for Kabbara) and El-Nouri (699 votes, compared to 534 for Kabbara), as well as Mina, as mentioned above. The last winner from the list in Tripoli, Dima Jamali, did not manage to win over 350 preferential votes in any neighborhood. Her highest totals were also in Tabbaneh and El-Haddadine (338 and 337 preferential votes), followed by Mina and El-Souayqa (234 and 221 votes). Jamali won less preferential votes than the two other winners on her list except in Wadi al-Nahle, where she, Kabbara, Jisr, Rifi, and Karami all received below 40 votes (with her and Kabbara receiving the highest number, 39).

On the Azm list, Mikati was more successful across Tripoli and won over 2,000 preferential votes in Tabbaneh (4,240 votes), followed by Mina (3,753 votes), El-Haddadine (3,686 votes), and El-Souayqa (2,079 votes). Ali Darwish, who won 2,211 preferential votes among residents (excluding public employees) won well over half of these from voters in Tabbaneh (1,604 votes), and more specifically, those in Alawite polling stations (1,343 votes). Jean Obeid won his highest number in Mina (241 votes), followed by Tabbaneh (225 votes), also relying on the voters in El-Qobbe (177 votes). Finally, Nicolas Nahas received a high share of his preferential votes from Mina (381 votes), followed by El-Zahrieh (321 votes).

The last winner in Tripoli, Faisal Karami, similar to the other Sunni candidates, won most of his preferential votes from voters in Tabbaneh (1,409 votes), followed by El-Haddadine and Mina (1,273 and 1,207 votes).

Among the other candidates, Ashraf Rifi, who won nearly 5,800

preferential votes among residents, received his highest share in Tabbaneh (1,146 votes), followed by El-Haddadine (975 votes) and El-Souayqa (823 votes). Rifi, who won over twice as many preferential votes as winner Dima Jamali, received a higher share than her in all neighborhoods but Wadi al-Nahle, where they both won very low numbers (35 votes for Rifi, compared to 39 for Jamali). Taha Naji also won most of his preferential votes from these neighborhoods, receiving between 600 and 800 in each of them. Similar to Rifi, he won more preferential votes than Jamali in all neighborhoods, with the exception of Wadi al-Nahle, as well as Qalamoun (where she won over 110 votes, and he only won 32). On the same list, Ahmad Omran, who was more successful than Alawite winner Ali Darwish, won the vast majority of his votes from Tabbaneh (2,135 votes, out of the 2,776 he won among residents), with most of these also coming from Alawite polling stations (over 1,800 votes). Marada candidate Rafli Diab, who won 1,235 preferential votes among residents, received over half of these from voters in Mina (796 votes).

FPM candidate Tony Marouni won nearly half of his preferential votes among residents from voters in Mina (302 votes, out of the 625 he obtained among residents). Jama'a candidate Wasim Alwan's highest share of preferential votes (out of the nearly 1,930 he won among residents) came from voters in Qalamoun (555 votes), followed by El-Haddadine (283 votes) and Tabbaneh (217 votes).

In Dannieh, FM winner Sami Fatfat (who won 7,744 preferential votes among residents, excluding public employees) won a high share of his votes from voters in Sir El-Danniyeh (1,165 votes), as well as over 500 votes in Sfireh (789 votes), Qarsaita (511 votes), and Bqarsouna (507 votes). The second winner in Dannieh, Jihad Al-Samad (who won 11,579 votes among residents) on Karami's list, received a lower share of votes than Fatfat in Sir El-Danniyeh (586 votes) and Qarsaita (301 votes). The highest number of preferential votes Jihad Al-Samad obtained was in Bakhaoun (2,473 votes), while he won over 600 votes in Sfireh (819 votes), Bkaa Safrin, and Bqarsouna (about 600 votes each).

The second candidate on the FM list, Qassem Abdel Aziz (6,259 votes among residents) who came in third in Dannieh, won a high share in Bakhaoun (1,489 votes), where he performed better than Fatfat (235 votes), although Al-Samad came ahead of him. Abdel Aziz only managed to win over 500 preferential votes in one other cadaster, Sfireh (548 votes). Mohammad Fadel on the Azm list, who was also successful (3,895 votes among residents), won his highest share in Sfireh (642 votes), followed by Sir El-Danniyeh (384 votes).

In Minnieh, FM winner Osman Alameddine, who won 9,956 preferential votes among residents, received over half of these in the cadaster of Minnieh (5,150 votes, or over half of preferential votes

in the cadaster). He also won over 1,000 preferential votes in Nabi Youcheaa (1,761 votes), Deir Aamar (1,468 votes), and Bhannine (1,119 votes). Given that these were large cadasters, most candidates tended to receive over half of their votes from them.

The second-most-successful candidate in Minnieh, Kazem Kheir (Azm list, 6,597 votes among residents), also won nearly half of his votes from the cadaster of Minnieh (3,114 votes), and a high share in Nabi Youcheaa (1,275 votes) and Deir Aamar (1,068 votes). He was able to win a higher share of preferential votes than Osman Alameddine only in Borj El-Yahoudiyeh (204 votes, compared to 72 for Alameddine), Markabta (168 votes compared to 147), and Terbol (84 votes compared to only 6 votes). Kamal Kheir, on the list backed by FPM, who received over half of the preferential votes that went to his list in North 2, also won half of these from the cadaster of Minnieh (1,288 votes, out of the 2,115 he obtained among residents). He was never able to win a higher number of preferential votes than Kazem Kheir, but won a slightly higher number than Osman Alameddine in Markabta (158 votes), where votes were highly contested.

What are the main drivers of votes for the winning lists?

Overall, in North 2, the FM list performed better in more homogeneous cadasters, polling stations that had only one sect registered to vote, cadasters with lower levels of economic development, those with higher poverty rates, and those with a higher ratio of refugees per capita. Controlling for other factors, women tended to vote more for the list than men. By sect, Sunnis tended to vote more for the list than others.

Similarly, Faisal Karami's list obtained better results in more homogeneous cadasters, less economically developed ones, and those with higher poverty rates and a higher ratio of refugees per capita. However, the list tended to be more successful in mixed polling stations and among male voters. By sect, Alawites, followed by Maronites, were the most likely to vote for the list, while Armenian Orthodox voters were the least likely to do so.

The Azm list performed better in more heterogeneous cadasters, those with higher levels of economic development and lower poverty rates. Across confessional groups, Armenian Orthodox voters were the most likely to vote for the list, and were followed by Alawites, while there were no significant variations among other groups.

Figure 18 Drivers of votes for the FM list in North 2




Figure 19 Drivers of votes for Karami's list in North 2





Figure 20 Drivers of votes for the Azm list in North 2



There were some variations across minor districts. In Tripoli, among the geographical characteristics, higher levels of economic development in a cadaster were associated with a higher share of votes for the Azm list, while they were associated with a lower one for Karami's list. Cadasters with a higher prevalence of poverty generally saw a higher share of votes cast for the Azm and Karami's list. Both the level of economic development and poverty rates in a cadaster had no significant effect on the results for FM in Tripoli. Regarding the level of sectarian homogeneity in a cadaster, voters in more homogeneous cadasters were generally less likely to vote for the FM and Azm lists, with no significant effect on Karami's list's results.

Across polling stations, voters in homogeneous stations were more likely to vote for the FM list, while they were less likely to vote for Karami's. Across confessional groups, Sunni voters were the most likely to vote for the FM list, as well as among the most likely to vote for Azm, while they were less likely to vote for Karami's list compared to most other groups. Alawite voters were the least likely to vote for the FM and the most likely to vote for Karami's list, while Greek Orthodox voters were also among the most likely to vote for Karami's, although they were also among the most likely to vote for the FM list. Regarding Maronite voters, they were the least likely to vote for the Azm list. Finally, the few Armenian Orthodox voters tended to vote more for the Azm list, and were much less likely to vote for Karami's.

In Dannieh, voters in more homogeneous cadasters tended to vote more for the FM list, as well as Karami's, while the Azm list generally performed better in more heterogeneous cadasters. This could be related to the higher share of Christian voters, who showed higher support for the Azm list relative to Sunni voters, registered in heterogeneous cadasters in Dannieh. Higher levels of economic

development in a cadaster were associated with a higher share of votes for the Azm and Karami's lists, and the latter also tended to receive better results in cadasters with lower poverty rates. The opposite was true for the FM list, which tended to perform better in cadasters with higher poverty rates. Across polling stations, voters in homogeneous stations were more likely to vote for the FM list, and less likely to vote for the Azm list, which tended to perform better in mixed stations. Finally, across confessional groups, Sunni voters were the most likely to vote for the FM list to a large extent, Maronite voters were more likely to vote for Karami's list, and Greek Orthodox voters were more likely to vote for the Azm list compared to other groups.

Finally, in Minnieh, the FM list tended to receive a higher share of votes in cadasters with lower levels of economic development, as well as those with higher poverty rates. Voters in homogeneous polling stations were more likely to vote for the list, and across confessional groups, Sunnis were significantly more likely to vote for the list compared to Greek Orthodox voters. Karami's list tended to receive a lower share of votes in cadasters with higher levels of sectarian homogeneity, and a higher one in cadasters with lower poverty rates. No other factor affected votes for the list in Minnieh. Only poverty rates affected votes for Azm in Minnieh, with the list tending to perform better in cadasters with lower poverty rates.

IV Do citizens cast preferential votes for candidates from their own confession?

In Tripoli, 95% of voters represented by a seat gave a preferential vote for one candidate within their selected list. Among those who cast a preferential vote, 93% voted for a candidate from their own confession.

The percentage of votes given to co-confessional candidates varied across confessional groups

The share of votes cast for co-confessional candidate was highest among Sunni voters, with 94% of them opting for a Sunni candidate. They were followed by Alawite voters (85%). Christian groups gave a lower share of their votes to candidates from their own sect, with 61% of Greek Orthodox voters, and only 37% of Maronites voting for a co-confessional candidate. The highest share of the Maronite vote went to Greek Orthodox candidates instead (38%), while most of the remaining went to Sunni candidates (22%). Similarly, Greek Orthodox voters gave the remainder of their vote to Sunni and Maronite candidates (23% and 16%), and Alawite voters to Sunni candidates (14%). Given the high number of Sunni candidates in Tripoli, these combined were successful among all confessional groups. Alawite candidates barely won any votes from non-Alawite voters, while Greek

Orthodox and Maronite candidates barely won any votes from non-Christian voters.

Among the Armenian Orthodox, who are not represented by a seat in Tripoli, the majority of votes went to Greek Orthodox candidates (60%), while the remainder was split between Maronite and Sunni candidates (22% and 18%). In mixed stations, the majority of voters chose a Sunni candidate (65%), and among other candidates, Greek Orthodox candidates were the preferred ones (15%), followed by Alawites (12%), while Maronite candidates were the least successful (9%).

The confessional bias did not significantly vary across genders, as it was only 0.4% higher among women voters (92.8% compared to 92.4%).

Table 2 Percentage of votes for candidates from each confession by confessional group in Tripoli

		Candidate's sect			
		Sunni	Alawite	Greek Orthodox	Maronite
Voters' sect	Sunni	94%	1%	1%	3%
	Alawite	14%	85%	1%	1%
	Greek Orthodox	23%	1%	61%	16%
	Maronite	22%	3%	38%	37%
	Armenian Orthodox	18%	1%	60%	22%
	Mixed confession	65%	12%	15%	9%

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

There were no large variations in preferences for co-confessional candidates across cadasters in Tripoli

The confessional bias in Tripoli was widespread across the district. In all cadasters, over 90% of voters cast a confessional vote, with the exception of El-Zahrieh, where 85% of voters did. The share of votes cast for co-confessional candidates was highest in El-Haddadine and El-Mhatra (96% each).

However, there were some variations within each confessional group. Maronite voters only had their own polling stations in El-Qobbe, where 37% of them voted for a co-confessional candidate. Greek Orthodox voters, who had their own polling stations in four cadasters, gave their lowest share of votes to Greek Orthodox candidates in Mina (58%), and their highest in El-Zahrieh (70%), while in Al-Tall and El-Qobbe, 64% and 63% voted for a Greek Orthodox candidate. There was no significant variation among Alawites. Alawite voters had their own stations in Tabbaneh and El-Qobbe, where 85% and 83% voted for a co-confessional candidate. Finally, all cadasters had Sunni-only polling stations. In none of these did less than 90% of Sunni voters choose a Sunni candidate. The co-confessional vote among Sunnis was lowest in El-Zahrieh (92%), and

highest in El-Haddadine and El-Mhatra (96%).

Given that all represented groups but Sunnis had their own polling stations in only a few cadasters, it is possible to determine the percentage of votes that went to each type of candidate across cadasters, and compare that to the share of registered voters from each confessional group. This demonstrates how candidates tended to perform better in areas that had a higher share of their co-confessional voters.

There was only a significant share of Alawite voters in Tabbaneh and El-Qobbe, which were the only cadasters that had Alawite-only polling stations, and the only cadasters where Alawite candidates obtained a significant share of votes. The same was observed among Greek Orthodox candidates, who obtained a higher share of votes in cadasters that had a significant share of Greek Orthodox voters. Maronite voters, who, as mentioned above, only had two polling stations in El-Qobbe, also constituted a significant share of voters in Al-Tall, El-Zahrieh, and Mina. In these cadasters, Maronite candidates tended to perform better, compared to cadasters which had a very low share of Maronite voters, which could suggest that the confessional bias among Maronite voters was higher.

Table 3 Percentage of votes for candidates from each confession by cadaster in Tripoli


Cadaster	Candidate's sect				Confessional composition of the cadaster			
	Sunni	Alawite	Greek		Sunni	Alawite	Greek	
			Orthodox	Maronite			Orthodox	Maronite
Beddawi	92%	2%	2%	4%	100%	0%	0%	0%
Tabbaneh	72%	24%	1%	2%	64%	32%	1%	1%
Al-Tall	81%	2%	10%	7%	41%	1%	15%	31%
Haddadine	95%	1%	1%	2%	95%	1%	3%	1%
Hadid	95%	1%	2%	3%	99%	0%	1%	0%
El-Remmaneh	91%	1%	4%	4%	74%	0%	14%	6%
El-Zahrieh	58%	1%	31%	10%	26%	0%	47%	11%
El-Souayqa	95%	1%	1%	3%	99%	0%	0%	0%
El-Qobbe	77%	14%	5%	4%	52%	22%	12%	11%
Qalamoun	92%	1%	3%	5%	98%	0%	0%	0%
El-Mhatra	96%	0%	2%	2%	97%	0%	1%	2%
Mina	83%	1%	11%	5%	48%	1%	33%	8%
El-Nouri	95%	1%	2%	2%	89%	0%	5%	4%
Wadi al-Nahle	96%	1%	2%	1%	85%	1%	0%	0%

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Beddawi, Tabbaneh, and Wadi al-Nahle are part of the same cadaster.

Beyond the confessional composition of each cadaster, the percentage of votes for co-confessional candidates tended to increase as the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster increased: From 86% on average in the most heterogeneous cadasters to 94% in the most homogeneous ones. However, when controlling for voters' confession, their gender, and some geographical level characteristics, this factor was not statistically significant.


Figure 21 Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and percentage of votes for co-sectarian candidates in Tripoli



What are the drivers of votes for co-confessional candidates in Tripoli?

Despite the higher percentage of co-sectarian votes in more homogeneous cadasters, this factor was not statistically significant when controlling for other cadaster-level characteristics, as well as voters' sect and gender. This might be because most cadasters had no polling stations reserved for all sects, except Sunnis, meaning the co-sectarian vote can be measured in very few cadasters for each confessional group. Regarding other factors, voters in cadasters with higher levels of economic development, and those in cadasters with lower poverty rates tended to vote more for candidates from their own confessional group. There were large variations across confessions: Sunnis were significantly more likely to cast a sectarian vote compared to others, while Maronite voters were the least likely. Alawite and Greek Orthodox voters fell in between, with the former being more likely than the latter.

Figure 22 Drivers of votes for co-sectarian candidates in Tripoli



V How did women candidates perform?

Only eight of the 75 candidates in North 2 were women. Altogether, they received 2.6% of votes.

Seven women candidates ran in Tripoli, out of the total 53, where they won 4.3% of preferential votes (3,598 votes), and Dima Jamali (FM) obtained a Sunni seat with 2.4% of preferential votes in Tripoli (2,066 votes). The eighth woman candidate ran in Dannieh and received five preferential votes only.

The women candidates in Tripoli were Dima Jamali (FM, Sunni, 2,066 votes), Layla Chahoud (independent on FM list, Alawite, 443 votes), Mervat El-Hoz (independent on Azm list, Sunni, 452 votes), Farah Issa (Kulluna Watani, Greek Orthodox, 452 votes), Nariman Chamaa (Kulluna Watani, Sunni, 111 votes), Nariman El-Jamal (independent on Jama'a-backed list, Sunni, 47 votes), and Hiba Naja (Independent Civil Society list, Sunni, 27 votes), and the woman candidate in Dannieh was Samah Arja (Independent Civil Society list, Sunni, five votes).

Across the district of Tripoli, Dima Jamali won her highest share of preferential votes in Tabbaneh, followed by El-Haddadine (338 and 337 votes), and managed to win over 200 in Mina and El-Souayqa (234 and 221 votes). On the same list, Layla Chahoud won over half of her total votes from Tabbaneh (261 votes), and received a high number in El-Qobbe (68 votes). The highest number of preferential votes Mervat El-Hoz obtained was in El-Haddadine (82 votes), followed by Mina and El-Souayqa (69 and 64 votes). In Kulluna Watani, Farah Issa received over one-quarter of her preferential votes from voters in Mina (135 votes), and also managed to receive a high number in El-Zahrieh (82 votes). Nariman Chamaa won her highest number of preferential votes

in El-Haddadine (23 votes), and won 10 preferential votes in each of Al-Tall, Mina, and Tabbaneh. Nariman El-Jamal won less than five preferential votes in all neighborhoods but El-Qobbe and El-Souayqa (12 and 11 votes). Finally, Hiba Naja's highest number of votes was in Tabbaneh (six votes), while she won four or less in all other neighborhoods of Tripoli.

Women were more likely to vote for women candidates

In Tripoli, support for women candidates varied across genders, and women gave a higher share of their preferential votes to women candidates: 5% of voters in women-only stations voted for women candidates, while 3% of voters in men-only stations did so. In gender-mixed stations, the share fell in between (4.5%). Women voters voted more for each of the women candidates.

The share of preferential votes received by Dima Jamali in women-only stations was nearly double the share of votes she received in men-only stations—or slightly over 3% compared to under 2% (1,294 and 665 preferential votes, respectively). In gender-mixed stations, Jamali's share of votes was lower (1%, 60 votes). On the same list as Jamali, Layla Chahoud was slightly more successful among women voters, winning 0.6% of their preferential vote (222 votes) compared to 0.5% of men's (190 votes).

In Kulluna Watani, Farah Issa also received a higher number of votes among women (188 votes, 0.5% of their votes) than men voters (149 votes, 0.4%), and won a much higher share of votes in gender-mixed stations (80 votes, 2%). Nariman Chamaa was only slightly more successful among women (49 compared to 38 votes in men-only stations).

On the Azm list, Mervat El-Hoz received significantly higher support from women voters: 261 women gave her their preferential votes (0.7%) compared to 160 of men (0.4%), and about 20 voters in gender-mixed stations (0.5%). Nariman Jamal (Jama'a-backed list) and Hiba Naja (Independent Civil Society list) who were the least successful women candidates in Tripoli, were also more popular among women voters. Nariman Jamal received twice as many preferential votes from women voters than she did from men—29 compared to 14 votes. Finally, Hiba Naja won 16 votes from women, compared to 10 from men.

Table 4 Number and percentage of votes for women candidates by gender in Tripoli

	Total	FM list		Azm list	Jama'a-Independents	Kulluna Watani		Independent Civil Society	
		Dima Jamali	Layla Chahoud	Mervat El-Hoz	Nariman El-Jamal	Nariman Chamaa	Farah Issa	Hiba Naja	
Number of votes	Men	1,226	665	190	160	14	38	149	10
	Women	2,059	1,294	222	261	29	49	188	16
	Mixed gender	192	60	19	21	1	11	80	0
Share of votes	Men	3.2%	1.7%	0.5%	0.4%	0.0%	0.1%	0.4%	0.0%
	Women	5.2%	3.3%	0.6%	0.7%	0.1%	0.1%	0.5%	0.0%
	Mixed gender	4.5%	1.4%	0.4%	0.5%	0.0%	0.3%	1.9%	0.0%

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Support for women candidates varied across confessional groups, and each woman performed best among her co-sectarian constituents

There were large variations in the preferential votes cast for women candidates across confessional groups, with the share varying from less than 1% to nearly 7%.

In Tripoli, voters in Greek Orthodox and Maronite stations gave the highest share of their preferential votes to women candidates (7%). They were followed by voters in Alawite and mixed stations (5%), and those in Sunni stations (4%). The lowest share given to women candidates was among voters in Armenian Orthodox stations (slightly less than 2%). All of these variations across confessional groups are statistically significant, even after controlling for voters' gender and characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered.

Preferences for specific women varied, and one woman candidate tended to obtain the majority of preferential votes that went to women candidates among each confessional group.

The majority of Sunni voters who cast a ballot for a woman candidate chose Dima Jamali (1,885 out of the 2,745 voters in Sunni stations who voted for a woman candidate in Tripoli). She overall won nearly 3% of their preferential vote, ranking seventh among this group, and winning over 90% of her votes from Sunni voters. By contrast, less than 15 voters from all other single-confession stations combined cast preferential votes for Jamali, with most of the remainder of her votes coming from confessionally mixed stations (121 preferential votes). Mervat El-Hoz was the second most successful woman candidate among Sunni voters, receiving more preferential votes than all other women except Dima Jamali (413 votes, 0.6%). Nearly all of her preferential votes came from Sunni-only stations, with only four coming from other homogeneous stations, and 25 coming from mixed ones. While

Sunni voters showed support for the Greek Orthodox candidate Farah Issa (Kulluna Watani), the other Sunni women candidates in Tripoli received nearly all of their votes from Sunni voters. Out of the 98 preferential votes Nariman Chamaa received from residents, 83 were cast by Sunni voters; out of the 44 Nariman El-Jamal received from residents, 40 were cast by Sunnis; and out of the 26 Hiba Naja received from residents, 25 were cast by Sunnis.

Nearly all Alawite voters who chose a woman candidate voted for the Alawite candidate Layla Chahoud (250 voters out 256, 5%). She was overall the third most voted for candidate among Alawite voters—although by a high margin compared to the second candidate. Chahoud also won a high share of her preferential votes from voters in Sunni stations, although she was less successful than many other women among this group (140 votes), with the remainder of her preferential votes coming from mixed stations (35 votes).

Nearly all voters in Greek Orthodox stations who voted for a woman candidate chose the Greek Orthodox candidate Farah Issa (158 votes out of 178). She was overall the fifth-most-voted candidate among Greek Orthodox voters (6% of their preferential votes). She received an equal share of her preferential votes from Sunni polling stations (159 votes), with most of the remainder coming from mixed stations (93 votes).

Table 5 Number and percentage of votes for women candidates by confessional group in Tripoli

	Total	FM list		Azm list	Jama'a-Independents	Kulluna Watani		Independent Civil Society
		Dima Jamali	Layla Chahoud	Mervat El-Hoz	Nariman El-Jamal	Nariman Chamaa	Farah Issa	Hiba Naja
Number of votes								
Sunni	2,745	1,885	140	413	40	83	159	25
Alawite	256	3	250	2	0	0	1	0
Greek Orthodox	178	10	2	1	3	4	158	0
Maronite	9	0	4	0	0	0	4	1
Armenian Orthodox	3	0	0	1	0	0	2	0
Mixed confession	286	121	35	25	1	11	93	0
Share of votes								
Sunni	4%	3%	0.2%	0.6%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.0%
Alawite	5%	0.1%	5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Greek Orthodox	7%	0.4%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%	6%	0.0%
Maronite	7%	0.0%	3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3%	0.7%
Armenian Orthodox	2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	1%	0.0%
Mixed confession	5%	2%	0.6%	0.4%	0.0%	0.2%	2%	0.0%

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

In Dannieh, the only woman who ran, Samah Arja (Independent Civil Society list), won only five preferential votes. Two Sunni voters, one Maronite, and one voter in a mixed station voted for her, and by gender, three women and one man did so; in addition to one emigrant.


The majority of women candidates performed poorly within their lists
Dima Jamali was one of the exceptions, receiving the third highest share of preferential votes among candidates on the FM list in Tripoli, and sixth highest among all candidates in the list in North 2. On the same list, however, Layla Chahoud received the lowest share—both in Tripoli and North 2 overall. A second exception was Farah Issa in Kulluna Watani, who received the second-highest share of preferential votes among candidates on her list; however, Nariman Chamaa ranked fifth in Kulluna Watani in Tripoli, and sixth in North 2. Mervat El-Hoz on the Azm list ranked second-to-last in her list in Tripoli (and ninth in North 2), and Nariman Jamal also ranked second-to-last on the Jama'a-backed list, although by a very small margin (only four more votes than the last candidate in her list). Finally, in the Independent Civil Society list, Hiba Naja received the lowest number of preferential votes in Tripoli overall, and Samah Arja the lowest number of votes in North 2 overall.

What are the drivers of votes for women candidates in Tripoli?

A number of factors affected voters' decisions to vote for women in Tripoli. At the cadaster-level, voters registered in cadasters with higher levels of economic development, and those in cadasters with lower poverty rates tended to vote significantly more for women.

Gender was a highly determining factor. Compared to men, women were significantly more likely to vote for women candidates. Regarding sect, Greek Orthodox voters were the most likely to vote for a woman candidate. They were closely followed by Maronite and Alawite voters, while Sunnis and Armenian Orthodox voters were the least likely to vote for a woman candidate.

Figure 23 Drivers of votes for women candidates in Tripoli



VI How did emerging political groups perform?

Two independent lists ran in North 2. The first one, Kulluna Watani, received 2% of votes in North 2, while the second one, 'Independent Civil Society', received only 0.3%.

How did Kulluna Watani perform?

Kulluna Watani, the coalition between independent and emerging groups, received 2% of votes in North 2 (2,680 votes), and fielded 10 candidates. The list was more successful among the diaspora, winning 6% of their votes (157 votes).

In Tripoli, the list had eight candidates and received 2.6% of votes (2,274 votes). The candidates in the list were Yahya Mawloud (Sunni, 909 votes), Farah Issa (Greek Orthodox, 452 votes), Malek Mawlawi (Sunni, 299 votes), Mohammad Maalaki (Sunni, 131 votes), Nariman Chamaa (Sunni, 111 votes), Moussa Khoury (Maronite, 106 votes), Wassek Mokadem (Sunni, 97 votes), and Zein Al-Dib (Alawite, 36 votes).

In Dannieh, Kulluna Watani won 1% of votes (318 votes), and had only one candidate, Dani Osman, who won 297 preferential votes. In Minnieh, the list received 0.4% (88 votes), and the candidate Ahmad Dhaibi won 51 preferential votes.

There were variations in the votes received by Kulluna Watani across confessional groups, and very minor ones across genders

In Tripoli, Greek Orthodox and Maronite voters gave a higher share of their votes to the list, compared to others (13% and 12%). The share of votes given to Kulluna Watani among other groups was lower than 5%. Among voters in Armenian Orthodox and confessionally

mixed stations, 4% voted for Kulluna Watani, while 2% of Sunnis, and less than 1% of Alawites did so. These variations across confessional groups are statistically significant. However, given the higher number of votes cast in Sunni-only stations, the majority of the votes received by Kulluna Watani came from Sunni voters (1,519 votes out of the 2,135 it won among residents, excluding public employees). The second-highest share came from Greek Orthodox voters and those in mixed stations (332 and 228 votes), while, in total, less than 60 votes came from other types of stations. Across genders, the votes did not significantly vary—they were only slightly higher among women voters (1,014 votes, 2.4%) than among male voters (911 votes, 2.3%), however, the share of votes given to the list was significantly higher in gender-mixed stations (210 votes, 5%).

Table 6 Number and percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani by confessional group and gender in Tripoli

		Number of votes	Share of votes
Confessional group	Sunni	1,519	2.1%
	Alawite	32	0.6%
	Greek Orthodox	332	12.6%
	Maronite	17	12.1%
	Armenian Orthodox	7	3.8%
	Mixed confession	228	3.7%
Gender	Men	911	2.3%
	Women	1,014	2.4%
	Mixed gender	210	4.8%

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Support for specific candidates did not significantly differ across genders

There were only minor variations in support for Kulluna Watani candidates across genders.

Yahya Mawloud ranked first in male and female polling stations, but received a slightly higher number of preferential votes in women-only stations (439 votes, compared to 390 in male ones). He ranked second in gender-mixed stations (54 votes), in which Farah Issa received higher support (80 votes, 2%). Issa ranked second on her list among both genders, and was also only slightly more successful among women voters (188 votes) than she was among men (149 votes). The third candidate, Malek Mawlawi, was the only one on the list to receive a higher number of votes among men (136 votes) than among women (120 votes). The votes for all other Kulluna Watani candidates—Mohammad Maalaki, Nariman Chamaa, Moussa Khoury,

Wassek Mokadem, and Zein Al-Dib—were nearly similar across genders (being between zero and 11 votes higher among women). One notable result was in the votes for Moussa Khoury, who won a third of his votes from voters in gender-mixed polling stations (34 votes).

Table 7 Number and percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani candidates by gender in Tripoli

		Yahya Mawloud	Farah Issa	Malek Mawlawi	Mohammad Maaliki	Nariman Chamaa	Moussa Khoury	Wassek Mokadem	Zein Al-Dib
Number of votes	Men	390	149	136	57	38	33	42	15
	Women	439	188	120	61	49	34	45	15
	Mixed gender	54	80	12	4	11	34	1	3
Share of votes	Men	1.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%
	Women	1.1%	0.5%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%
	Mixed gender	1.3%	1.9%	0.3%	0.1%	0.3%	0.8%	0.0%	0.1%

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Kulluna Watani voters had a confessional bias

In Tripoli, even Kulluna Watani voters had a confessional bias. All Sunni candidates on the list outperformed others among Sunni voters, with the exception of Farah Issa (Greek Orthodox) who ranked third. Greek Orthodox Kulluna Watani voters mostly chose Farah Issa, while Maronites voted mostly for Moussa Khoury (Maronite)—although a very low number of voters in Maronite polling stations voted for a Kulluna Watani candidate (15, with five going to Khoury)—and Alawite voters mostly voted for Zein Al-Dib (Alawite).

Among candidates on the list, Yahya Mawloud received the first- or second-highest share of preferential votes among Kulluna Watani voters in all types of polling stations. He received the highest share of preferential votes among Sunni Kulluna Watani voters, by far, with nearly half of those who voted for the list giving him their preferential vote (686 out of the 1,423 who voted for a Kulluna Watani candidate in Tripoli). Overall, 1% of Sunni voters voted for him, making him the 15th most voted for candidate among this group. Among most other groups, he was the second-most preferred Kulluna Watani candidate. Mawloud won a high share of preferential votes among Greek Orthodox voters (119 votes, 5%), followed by voters in mixed stations (62 votes, 1%).

The second-most successful candidate on the list, Farah Issa (Greek Orthodox), received the highest share of preferential votes among Greek Orthodox voters, with nearly half of them who voted for a Kulluna Watani candidate in Tripoli choosing her (158 out of 321). She also won 6% of their preferential votes, making her the fifth

most voted candidate among this group in Tripoli. Issa won a similar number of preferential votes among Sunni voters (159 votes), with most of the remainder of her votes coming from mixed stations (93 votes), where she outperformed the other candidates in the list. This result could potentially be explained by the higher share of Christian voters registered in mixed polling stations.

Malek Mawlawi, the third Kulluna Watani candidate, received nearly all of his votes from his co-confessional voters, Sunnis (241 votes out of the 268 residents who voted for him). All other Sunni candidates in the list also received most of their votes from Sunni voters: Mohammad Maalaki obtained 119 of his votes from Sunnis, out of the 122 he received from residents; Nariman Chamaa obtained 83 of her 98 votes from Sunnis; and Wassek Mokadem 84 of his 88 votes from Sunni voters.

The Maronite candidate Moussa Khoury was the most popular among his co-sectarian voters. Although a low number of Maronite voters voted for Kulluna Watani overall, he received the highest number of votes among Maronites (five, or one-third of the votes they gave to Kulluna Watani candidates). Khoury performed much better than all other candidates, except Issa and Mawloud, in Greek Orthodox and mixed stations (27 and 32 votes, respectively), which again highlights the sectarian bias among Kulluna Watani voters.

Finally, the last candidate in Tripoli, Zein Al-Dib (Alawite), was the preferred candidate among Alawite voters, and received nearly half of his preferential votes from them (16, out of the 33 he won among residents). Similarly, the majority of Alawite voters who voted for a Kulluna Watani candidate (29 votes) chose Al-Dib.

Table 8 Number and percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani candidates by confessional group in Tripoli

	Yahya Mawloud	Farah Issa	Malek Mawlawi	Mohammad Maaliki	Nariman Chamaa	Moussa Khoury	Wassek Mokadem	Zein Al-Dib	
Number of votes	Sunni	686	159	241	119	83	37	84	14
	Alawite	9	1	2	0	0	0	1	16
	Greek Orthodox	119	158	10	1	4	27	2	0
	Maronite	4	4	2	0	0	5	0	0
	Armenian Orthodox	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mixed confession	62	93	13	2	11	32	1	3
Share of votes	Sunni	1.0%	0.2%	0.4%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%
	Alawite	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
	Greek Orthodox	4.6%	6.1%	0.4%	0.0%	0.2%	1.1%	0.1%	0.0%
	Maronite	3.0%	3.0%	1.5%	0.0%	0.0%	3.7%	0.0%	0.0%
	Armenian Orthodox	1.7%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Mixed confession	1.1%	1.6%	0.2%	0.0%	0.2%	0.5%	0.0%	0.1%

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

In Dannieh, Kulluna Watani received the highest share of votes among Greek Orthodox voters (3%), followed by Maronites (2%). It only won 0.7% of votes among Sunni voters, and 1.3% in mixed stations. Given the higher number of votes cast in Sunni-only stations, the majority of the votes received by the list came from Sunni voters (180 out of the 297 it won among residents, excluding public employees). The second-highest share came from voters in mixed stations (56 votes), followed by Greek Orthodox (37 votes), with the lowest coming from Maronite stations (24 votes). Across genders, Kulluna Watani was slightly more successful among women, winning 1% of their vote (128 votes), compared to 0.7% of men's vote (97 votes). In gender-mixed stations, the list received 1% of votes (72 votes). The only candidate in the list, Dani Osman, won 297 preferential votes in total (0.9%). Osman won 0.7% of Sunnis' preferential votes (173 votes), 2.8% among Greek Orthodox (34 votes), 1.5% among Maronites (19 votes), and 1.3% in mixed stations (52 votes). Across genders, he was slightly more successful among women, winning 0.9% (120 votes), compared to 0.7% among men (92 votes), and also won 1.1% of preferential votes in gender-mixed stations (66 votes).

Table 9 Number and percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani by confessional group and gender in Dannieh

	Kulluna Watani		Dani Osman	
	Number of votes	Share of votes	Number of votes	Share of votes
Sunni	180	0.7%	173	0.7%
Greek Orthodox	37	2.9%	34	2.8%
Maronite	24	1.8%	19	1.5%
Mixed confession	56	1.3%	52	1.3%
Men	97	0.7%	92	0.7%
Women	128	1.0%	120	0.9%
Mixed gender	72	1.1%	66	1.1%

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Finally, in Minnieh, Kulluna Watani's share of votes was also highest among Greek Orthodox voters (2.6%), which, however, only represents 12 votes. The list won 2% in mixed stations (22 votes), and only 0.2% in Sunni ones (44 votes). Across genders, the votes received by the list were twice as high among women (0.5%, 54 votes) than among men (0.2%, 22 votes). The candidate on the list, Ahmad Dhaibi, won over half of his preferential votes from Sunni voters (25 votes, 0.1%).

Table 10 Number and percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani by confessional group and gender in Minnieh

	Kulluna Watani		Ahmad Dhaibi	
	Number of votes	Share of votes	Number of votes	Share of votes
Sunni	44	0.2%	25	0.1%
Greek Orthodox	12	2.6%	8	1.9%
Mixed confession	22	2.0%	11	1.1%
Men	22	0.2%	16	0.2%
Women	54	0.5%	26	0.3%
Mixed gender	2	0.1%	2	0.1%


Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Kulluna Watani performed better in cadasters with lower levels of sectarian homogeneity

Apart from the performance of each Kulluna Watani candidate, there were some variations in the performance of the list across cadasters, although it won 5% of votes or less in nearly all neighborhoods. In Tripoli, where the list won 2.6% of votes overall, it obtained its best results in El-Zahrieh (8%) and Al-Tall (7%), performing better than the lists backed by Jama'a and FPM. In Dannieh, where Kulluna Watani won 0.9%, the highest share obtained by the list was 5% in Aaymar. It also won 3% of votes in a number of cadasters: Sfireh, Behouaita, Raouda, Kfar Habou, Kahf El-Malloul, and Haql El-Aazimeh. Finally, in Minnieh, where Kulluna Watani won 0.4% of votes, it won over 1% only in Terbol (1.6%) and Markabta (1.2%).


Beyond these, a number of factors affected voters' support for the list. In North 2, the percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani across the district was affected by the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster. In the most heterogeneous cadasters, the list obtained over 4% of votes on average, while in the most homogeneous ones it obtained less than 1%. This negative relationship between the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster and votes for Kulluna Watani was statistically significant even after controlling for other cadaster-level characteristics, as well as voters' gender and confession. This result points toward sectarian parties' higher capacity to mobilize voters in cadasters they know the sectarian composition of.

Figure 24 Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani in North 2



Other geographical characteristics affected votes for Kulluna Watani. Voters registered in cadasters with higher levels of economic development, as well as those in cadasters with lower poverty rates, were more likely to vote for Kulluna Watani. This could suggest voter rigging, as traditional parties may have a higher capacity to mobilize constituents in less developed areas, by offering benefits in exchange for votes.

Figure 25 Drivers of votes for Kulluna Watani in North 2



How did the 'Independent Civil Society' list perform?

The 'Independent Civil Society' list received 0.3% of votes in North 2 (448 votes), and fielded seven candidates. The list won a higher share of votes among emigrants (27 votes, 1%).

In Tripoli, the list had four candidates and received 0.4% of votes (394 votes). The candidates on the list were Jamal Badawi (Sunni, 258 votes), Hassane Khalil (Alawite, 47 votes), Fady Jamal (Greek Orthodox, 32 votes), and Hiba Naja (Sunni, 27 votes). In Dannieh, the list won 0.1% of votes (33 votes), and its candidates were Ayman Jamal (18 votes) and Samah Arja (five votes). In Minnieh, the list also won 0.1% (21 votes), and the candidate was Abdallah Rifai (13 votes).

There were no variations across genders

In Tripoli, men only gave a slightly higher number of their votes to the list (176 votes) than women (171 votes), with a few voters in gender-mixed stations voting for the list (18 voters). Support for candidates also did not vary, with the differences in the votes received by each being of less than 13 votes.

Table 11 Number and percentage of votes for 'Independent Civil Society' by gender in Tripoli

		Independent Civil Society	Jamal Badawi	Hassane Khalil	Fady Jamal	Hiba Naja
Number of votes	Men	176	119	21	15	10
	Women	171	106	24	10	16
	Mixed gender	18	14	0	3	0
Share of votes	Men	0.4%	0.3%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
	Women	0.4%	0.3%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
	Mixed gender	0.4%	0.3%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

The candidates in Tripoli performed best among their co-sectarian constituents

The votes obtained by the 'Independent Civil Society' list varied across confessional groups, although most of its votes came from Sunnis. The list received 0.4% of the Sunni vote (307 votes), 0.4% of the Alawite vote (22 votes), 0.6% of the Greek Orthodox (16 votes), and 1.4% of the votes in Maronite polling stations (which, however, only translates into two votes). In mixed stations, 0.3% of voters voted for the list (18 votes).

Each of the candidates performed best among their confessional communities. Among the 282 Sunni voters who voted for a candidate in the list, 226 chose Jamal Badawi, who won the remaining of his

votes from voters in mixed stations (13 votes). The second candidate among Sunnis was Hiba Naja (25 votes). All Alawite voters who voted for a candidate in the list chose Alawite candidate Hassane Khalil (22 voters). Among Greek Orthodox, 12 of the 15 who voted for a candidate in the list chose their co-sectarian one, Fady Jamal.

Table 12 Number and percentage of votes for 'Independent Civil Society' by confessional group in Tripoli

		Independent Civil Society	Jamal Badawi	Hassane Khalil	Fady Jamal	Hiba Naja
Number of votes	Sunni	307	226	20	11	25
	Alawite	22	0	22	0	0
	Greek Orthodox	16	0	3	12	0
	Maronite	2	0	0	1	1
	Armenian Orthodox	0	0	0	0	0
	Mixed confession	18	13	0	4	0
Share of votes	Sunni	0.4%	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Alawite	0.4%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%
	Greek Orthodox	0.6%	0.0%	0.1%	0.5%	0.0%
	Maronite	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.7%
	Armenian Orthodox	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Mixed confession	0.3%	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

In Dannieh, the list won less than 0.5% of votes in all types of polling stations. While it received 0.4% among Greek Orthodox and 0.3% among Maronite voters, these shares translate into nine votes. The list won only 30 votes among residents, with 18 of these coming from Sunni voters. The two candidates on the list received 23 preferential votes combined, with Ayman Jamal winning 18 and Samah Arja winning five. The majority of votes won by Jamal came from Sunni voters (10 votes).

Table 13 Number and percentage of votes for 'Independent Civil Society' by confessional group in Dannieh

	Independent Civil Society		Ayman Jamal		Samah Arja	
	Number of votes	Share of votes	Number of votes	Share of votes	Number of votes	Share of votes
Sunni	18	0.1%	10	0.0%	2	0.0%
Greek Orthodox	5	0.4%	4	0.3%	0	0.0%
Maronite	4	0.3%	2	0.2%	1	0.1%
Mixed confession	3	0.1%	1	0.0%	1	0.0%

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Finally, in Minnieh, where the 'Independent Civil Society' list won 21 votes overall, 19 Sunni voters and one Greek Orthodox voter voted for it. Across genders, 13 men, six women, and one voter in a gender-mixed station did so; while the last vote won by the list came from an emigrant. The candidate on the list, Abdallah Rifai, only won 13 preferential votes, all of them coming from Sunni voters.

The list performed better in more heterogeneous cadasters

The 'Independent Civil Society' list won less than 1% of votes in all cadasters across North 2. In Tripoli (where it won 0.4% of votes), the highest share it managed to obtain was 0.9% in Qalamoun and 0.8% in Al-Tall. Similarly, it won less than 0.5% of votes in all cadasters across Dannieh (0.1% of votes in total), except Haql El-Aazimeh, Aaymar, and Bahouaita, where it nevertheless only won between 0.7% and 0.8% of votes. In Minnieh, the list won few votes (0.1% in total), and 0.1% of votes or less in all cadasters with the exception of Rihaniyet-Miniyeh (0.3%).

Although it received barely any votes across the district, similar to Kulluna Watani, the independent list tended to perform better in more heterogeneous cadasters. This factor was statistically significant. The list also received better results in cadasters with higher levels of economic development, as well as those with lower poverty rates.

Figure 26 Sectarian homogeneity and percentage of votes for the 'Independent Civil Society' list in North 2





Figure 27 Drivers of votes for the 'Independent Civil Society' list in North 2



VII Were there any signs of irregularities?

Irregularities can occur during the election process, through ballot stuffing that either increases the total number of votes or adds votes for one party at the expense of another. Fraud can also occur during the vote aggregation process when there is collusion between certain candidates—usually the more connected ones—and election officials. Voter rigging—pressuring voters to cast ballots in a certain manner—tends to occur more in small polling stations, where it is easier to monitor voters' behavior. Therefore, testing whether turnout was abnormally higher in smaller voting centers can help approximate whether there was voter rigging. Another method of detecting signs of election fraud is to examine the distribution of turnout and vote numbers and testing whether they have a 'normal' shape. For example, an abnormally high number of voting centers with close to 100% turnout could suggest either voter or vote rigging at any stage of the election process. Other lines of research focus on statistical tests that examine the random nature of numbers to test whether those numbers were manipulated in a non-random manner.


There were irregular patterns in turnouts

Turnout usually has a normal shape, with the majority of electoral centers having a turnout close to the average and a small number of centers having a very high or very low turnout rate.

Compared to a normal distribution, North 2 had a higher number of polling stations with very high turnout rates (above 90%), as well as a much higher number of mid-turnout centers than expected (35%-45%). When comparing the actual distribution with a normal distribution, the differences are statistically significant.

Irregular patterns were present in each of the small districts, although they were most significant in Tripoli. Moreover, four polling stations in North 2 saw 100% turnouts. This might provide some initial suggestive evidence of irregularities, such as pressure to vote or ballot stuffing.

Figure 28 Distribution of turnout rates by polling station in North 2



There are some signs of voter rigging

Voter rigging entails political parties pressuring or coercing voters with the intended aim of affecting turnout. The literature on election irregularities distinguishes vote rigging from vote buying, as coercion is not apparent in the latter case. However, there are some ways to

detect potential instances of voter rigging through statistical tests. One way to test for voter rigging is by examining the correlation between turnouts and the size of a polling station. Previous evidence shows that polling stations with fewer voters are more attractive among politicians buying votes or exerting some kind of pressure on voters, as the smaller groups of voters facilitate aggregate monitoring of whether voters cast their ballots, and for whom.¹⁴ High turnouts in polling stations with fewer voters may therefore point at fraud in those stations.


In North 2, the very few centers with a smaller number of registered voters (300 or less) had abnormally high turnout rates, suggesting that politicians in the district may have exerted pressure on voters to vote. Overall, average turnout rates tended to decrease as the size of the polling station increased.

Moreover, turnout in small polling stations—those whose size was lower than one standard deviation below the mean station size—was higher than turnout in non-small stations, or 46% compared to 43%. These results might again suggest voter mobilization through pressure to vote, such as vote buying.


14 Rueda, M. R. 2016. 'Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation: Vote Buying Enforcement and Collective Monitoring.' *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(1): 163-177.

Figure 29 Polling station size and turnout rate in North 2

a Correlation between the size of a polling station and turnouts




b Turnout in small compared to non-small polling stations in North 2




Moreover, given that registered voters are segregated by confession and gender, political parties may have higher interest in targeting voters in specific polling stations, where their main constituents are registered to vote. Comparing the relationship between the size of a polling station and turnouts across homogeneous and mixed stations shows that this negative relationship existed in homogeneous rather than mixed centers with, on average, turnouts decreasing from over 90% in the smallest centers to 50% in the largest ones. All abnormally high turnouts observed in North 2 (above 90%) were in the smallest homogeneous centers. This suggests that parties targeted specific constituents.

Figure 30 Polling station size and turnout rates by type of polling station

a Homogeneous stations




b Mixed stations



Apart from polling stations' size, in polling stations where more than one confessional group was registered to vote, turnout was significantly lower (5% lower). Turnout in mixed stations was 38% on average, while turnout in homogeneous stations was 43%. Significantly lower turnouts in mixed compared to homogeneous stations were observed in each of the minor districts.

Figure 31 Turnout in homogeneous versus mixed polling stations in North 2




Given the correlation between the size of the polling stations and turnouts, it is possible to determine whether one specific list or party benefited from both smaller stations and higher turnouts. A party benefiting from smaller stations would point toward voter rigging on its part, as the votes cast in these stations would be easier to monitor. The list led by Karami seems to have benefited from smaller polling stations more than others. While in some polling stations with less than 300 registered voters the list did not perform as well, its share of votes increased to an average of 50% in polling stations that had 400 voters registered, when it steadily decreased until reaching 10% of


votes in the largest polling stations. We also observe that Karami's list obtained nearly 100% of votes in two polling stations, which could suggest some irregularities. There was no downward trend between the share of votes other lists obtained and the size of a polling station.

Figure 32 Polling station size and percentage of votes for the winning lists in North 2


a Polling station size and percentage of votes for the FM list



b Polling station size and percentage of votes for Karami's list



C Polling station size and percentage of votes for the Azm list



The FM and Karami's lists significantly benefited from high turnouts, which may suggest fraud on their part

Besides the size of the polling stations, normally, if there was a lack of pressure on voters to cast their ballots in a certain way, votes for each list should be more or less the similar regardless of turnouts by polling station.¹⁵ A higher share of votes for a list in stations with significantly high turnouts could be due to its higher capacity to mobilize its supporters, but could also suggest pressure to vote, or even ballot stuffing, as adding ballot for a list would increase both the votes for this list and turnouts in a polling station. A relationship between turnouts and votes for a list could be related to the variations in both turnout rates and support for lists across sectarian groups. In order to take into consideration differences across sects and votes for a list, standardized variables of turnout rates and percentage of votes for each list were created. For any polling station, the standardized turnout rate would be the turnout rate in the specific polling station minus the average turnout rate of all polling stations with registered voters from the same sect, all of it divided by the variability (standard deviation) of the turnout rates in those centers. This measures how abnormally low or high the turnout in a polling station is compared to all other stations within the same sect (one standard deviation below/above the mean turnout by polling station). The standardized measures of share of votes for lists follow the same procedure. As previous studies have found, no clear relation should be observed between turnouts and votes for a party in 'clean' elections.¹⁶

There were significant variations in the votes received by each list across turnout rates. The FM and Karami's lists significantly benefited

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Myagkov, M., P.C. Ordeshook,
and D. Shakin. 2009. *The
Forensics of Election Fraud.*
Cambridge University Press.

16
Ibid.

from very high turnouts, while the Azm list performed significantly worse in polling stations that had very high turnout rates.


The share of votes obtained by the FM list in stations that had very high turnouts was 7% higher than its share in polling stations that had normal turnout rates (40% compared to 33%). The list performed worse in polling stations that had very low turnouts (26%). Similarly, the share of votes obtained by the list led by Karami was 7% higher in very high turnout polling stations than it was in stations with normal turnouts (26% compared to 19%). These variations for both lists are significant.

Very high turnouts significantly harmed the Azm list's performance. The share of votes obtained by the list in polling stations with very high turnouts was 8% lower than its share in stations with normal turnouts (23% compared to 31%).

The list led by Rifi, the Jama'a-independents list, and Kulluna Watani also performed worse in polling stations that had very high turnouts. Very low turnouts, however, were associated with a much higher share of votes for the FPM-independents and Kulluna Watani lists. In polling stations which recorded very low turnouts, the FPM-independents list's share of votes was 4% higher than its share in stations with normal turnouts (7% compared to 3%), and Kulluna Watani's was also 4% higher (6% compared to 2%).

Very high turnouts that benefited the FM and Karami's lists could point toward pressure to vote for the candidates on these lists, which translated into a lower share of votes for candidates on the Azm list. However, it could also be due to their effective mobilization of voters. As seen above, Karami's list also performed better in smaller polling stations, providing some evidence of voter rigging that benefited the list. The better performance of the FPM-independents and Kulluna Watani lists in very low turnout centers could suggest that these tended to perform better among constituents that were not specifically targeted by the main candidates. It could also simply be due to their weaker mobilization of voters.

Figure 33 Percentage of votes for lists and standardized turnout rates in North 2



A list benefiting from very high turnouts could also suggest ballot stuffing, as adding ballots for a list would increase both turnouts and votes for this list in a polling station. In order to assess whether these high turnouts to the benefit of the FM and Karami's lists were due to voter or vote rigging, a number of tests specifically testing for votes rigging can be conducted.

There is some evidence of vote counting manipulations


Another type of election irregularities would be vote rigging, such as ballot stuffing and vote counting manipulations.

One way of detecting signs of ballot stuffing is to look at the correlation between the percentage of null votes and turnouts, as well as the votes for a specific list or party, in a polling station. Previous evidence shows that when political parties add ballots, they tend to forget to include a similar proportion of invalid votes.¹⁷ To detect irregular behaviors, one would need to observe that the lower the percentage of invalid votes in a polling station, the higher the turnout and the higher the percentage of votes for the list or party we think could have manipulated the vote count. However, a negative correlation is not enough to suggest ballot stuffing—as null votes could rather be 'protest' votes. Stronger evidence of ballot stuffing would be to see that the increase in the share of null votes is smaller than the decrease in the percentage of votes for a list or party.

In North 2, there was no correlation between the percentage of null votes and turnouts in a polling station. This was the case in all minor districts.

17
Friesen, P. 2019. 'Strategic Ballot Removal: An Unexplored Form of Electoral Manipulation in Hybrid Regimes.' *Democratization*, 26(4): 709-729.

Figure 34 Turnout and percentage of null votes by polling station in North 2



Beyond turnouts, examining the relationship between the votes for lists and the share of null votes in a polling station can provide a way to detect suggestive evidence of ballot stuffing. If one list added votes for its candidates, then we would need to see that the lower the percentage of null votes, the higher the percentage of votes for that list. Again, there is no evidence of ballot stuffing in North 2, with no significant variations in the votes for each list being observed as the share of null votes in a polling station increased. This was the case in all minor districts.

Another form of vote rigging would entail parties ‘cooking’ the numbers, i.e. parties manipulating the vote count either by adding or subtracting votes for a list, or ‘re-shuffling’ votes within their list from one candidate to another. One way of detecting manipulations in the vote counting process is to look at the distribution of the last digits in votes for a party.¹⁸ The last-digits test is based on the hypothesis that humans tend to be poor at making up numbers which would result in an abnormal distribution of numbers at the aggregate level. In ‘clean’ elections, last digits in votes for a party should be uniformly distributed, with an equal chance of every number (from 0 to 9) to appear (10% chance).

Looking at the distribution of the last digits in the number of votes for the main lists per polling station¹⁹ shows no irregularities in North 2 overall. However, when separating each of the minor districts, irregular patterns emerge in Tripoli, but not in Dannieh and Minnieh. In Tripoli, the last digits in the number of votes for the FM and Karami’s lists deviated from the uniform line. In both cases, there was a significantly higher number of votes ending in five. There was


¹⁸ Beber, B. and A. Scacco. 2012. ‘What the Numbers Say: A Digit-Based Test for Election Fraud.’ *Political Analysis*, 20(2): 211-234.

¹⁹ Here we restrict the sample of stations where each list obtained at least 30 votes to avoid an overcounting of ones or zeros.

also a lower number of votes for Karami’s list ending in six and nine than expected. These results could suggest ballot stuffing or votes re-shuffling that benefited these two lists.

Figure 35 Distribution of last digits in the number of votes for the FM list in Tripoli

a Frequency of last digits in the number of votes for the FM list



b Distribution of last digits in the number of votes for the FM list compared to the uniform distribution






Figure 36 Distribution of last digits in the number of votes for Karami's list in Tripoli

a Frequency of last digits in the number of votes for Karami's list



b Distribution of last digits in the number of votes for Karami's list compared to the uniform distribution



Overall, there are some signs of irregularities in North 2

There are some signs of irregularities in North 2, particularly to the benefit of Karami's list, although some evidence also existed for the FM list.

First, turnout tended to decrease as the size of a polling station increased. Previous evidence shows that polling stations with fewer voters are more attractive among politicians buying votes as the smaller number of registered voters facilitates aggregate monitoring of their behavior. This relationship therefore suggests that politicians may have exerted pressure on voters to vote. Looking at the performance of each list shows that Karami's list tended to receive a higher share of votes in smaller polling stations, with its share of votes steadily decreasing from the smallest to the largest stations.

Moreover, normally, if there was a lack of pressure on voters, votes for a list should not significantly vary across turnouts by polling station. A list receiving a significantly higher share of votes in polling stations with abnormally high turnouts could suggest voter rigging, such as vote buying. In North 2, the FM and Karami's lists performed better in stations that had abnormally high turnouts, while the Azm list performed worse, suggesting fraud on the part of the two former lists, which harmed the latter.

The better performance of the FM and Karami's lists in these stations could suggest ballot stuffing as well, as a party or list adding ballots for its candidates would increase both turnouts and votes for this list in a polling station. Signs of ballot stuffing can be detected when observing a negative relationship between the share of null votes and votes for a list or party in a polling station. No such relationships were observed in North 2. Another way to detect signs of ballot stuffing, or vote rigging more generally, is to look at the distribution in the last digits of votes for a list, which, in regular elections, should be uniformly distributed. Only in Tripoli, the last digits in the number of votes for the FM and Karami's lists deviated from the uniform distribution, which might suggest some ballot stuffing on their part.

The relationship between the size of the polling station, turnouts, and votes for Karami's list suggest there may have been some voter rigging. Moreover, the irregularities in the last digits in the number of votes for the list in Tripoli also suggest that there may have been some ballot stuffing. The FM list benefited from higher turnouts, which could suggest voter or vote rigging. The irregular distribution of the last digits in the number of votes for the list in Tripoli, however, points toward vote rigging.