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Interactions and Attitudes Between Lebanese and Syrian Communities in Lebanese Municipalities

Daniel Garrote Sánchez

Executive Summary

The presence of a large Syrian refugee population in Lebanon has had numerous impacts on the Lebanese economy and society. One main area of concern regards social cohesion between the local hosts and Syrian refugee communities. Various studies have suggested different, sometimes conflicting, theories on how the two communities engage with one another and what forms of interaction improve or hinder social cohesion. In order to better understand the dynamics and attitudes of the two communities, LCPS conducted in 2018 a survey of host and refugee communities in three mid-sized cities in Lebanon: Saida, Zahle, and Halba. Through the survey, we find numerous variations in attitudes between and among the two communities, as well as variations across the different municipalities arising from varying geographic, economic, and confessional factors. The policy brief concludes with recommendations on how to better improve social cohesion and move toward cooperation between the two communities.

1 UNDP. 2017. 'Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon.'

2 Dionigi, F. 2016. 'The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience.' *Middle East Center*, 15, 4-35.

3 CARE International. 2015. 'Inter-Community Relations: A Study of the Impact of the Syrian Refugee Influx on the Lebanese Host Community and its Repercussions on the Social Cohesion Contexts North and Mount Lebanon: T5 and Chouf'; and International Alert. 2014. 'Security Threat Perceptions in Lebanon.'

4 For an example of such programs, see Harb, C. and R. Saab. 2014. 'Social Cohesion and Intergroup Relations: Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Nationals in Bekaa and Akkar.' Save the Children.

5 First developed by Allport, G. W. 1954. 'The Nature of Prejudice.' Cambridge/Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

6 Boisjoly, J., G. J. Duncan, M. Kremer, D. Levy, and J. Eccles. 2006. 'Empathy or Antipathy? The Impact of Diversity.' *American Economic Review*, 96(5):1890-1905; Carrell, S. E., M. Hoekstra, and J. E. West. 2015. 'The Impact of College Diversity on Behavior Toward Minorities.' Forthcoming, *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*; Burns, J., L. Corno, and E. La Ferrara. 2018. 'Interaction, Stereotypes and Performance. Evidence from South Africa.' *BREAD Working Paper* 549; Finseraas, H. and A. Kotsadam. 2017. 'Does Personal Contact with Ethnic Minorities Affect Anti-Immigrant Sentiments? Evidence from a Field Experiment.' *European Journal of Political Research*, 56 (3): 703-722.

7 Scacco, A. and S. Warren. 2018. 'Can Social Contact Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria.' *American Political Science Review*, 112(3): 654-677.

8 Bobo, L. D. 1999. 'Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations.' *Journal of Social Issues*, 55(3): 445-472.

Introduction

The ongoing refugee crisis in Lebanon has put intense pressures not only on the tumbling domestic economy but also on the country's fragile sectarian balance and social fabric. Social cohesion, which can be understood as the strength of the relationships between different communities—in terms of ethnicity, religion, or nationality—has weakened, with emerging social tensions and hostilities between refugees on the one hand, and host communities and national authorities on the other.¹ Refugees are often blamed for placing a heavy burden on the weak public finances, creating unfair competition for low-skilled jobs, and are subject to resentment given the historical grievances dating back to the Syrian army's involvement in the Lebanese civil war and the subsequent occupation that lasted until 2005.² These tensions have sometimes escalated into violence toward refugees in diverse ways such as harassment, discrimination, curfews, and other mobility restrictions.³

While local integration of refugees has been systematically rejected by Lebanese authorities as a goal, the need for social stability requires public investments in strengthening the inter-communal relationships. Under these circumstances, numerous international organizations have developed programs to increase social cohesion between refugees and local host communities,⁴ although their effectiveness is largely unknown given the absence of rigorous evaluations or a deeper understanding on how inter-group attitudes are formed and shaped.

Past studies have developed and assessed different theories of social relations between groups. One strand of the literature has evaluated the 'contact hypothesis'⁵ which asserts that interpersonal contact can be an effective way of reducing prejudice and improving attitudes toward other groups under certain conditions. In the context of prolonged interactions among roommates in colleges or the military, different studies in the United States, Norway, and South Africa have found that being assigned to a room with a person from another race reduces prejudices and improves perceptions of minorities.⁶ Similarly, another study showed that local level interventions that incentivize contact between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria increased generosity and cooperation between them.⁷

Conversely, 'threat theory' argues that contact with outside groups might intensify conflict due to people's perceived competition for limited economic resources or conjure impulses to protect cultural and social identity.⁸ From this perspective, areas with larger presence of refugees would have more anti-immigrant attitudes. The evidence from different European countries with refugees is rather mixed. While studies in Denmark, Hungary, and Greece find that higher influx of refugees in a given area fuels more anti-refugee sentiments,⁹ the opposite is true in France and Austria.¹⁰ In Jordan, exposure

to larger economic competition in areas with higher concentrations of refugees are not associated with anti-refugee sentiments.¹¹

Different characteristics have been used to explain the discrepancies in results across studies, ranging from the duration of the interaction with the outside community to how voluntary the interactions are. In general, the shorter and more unintended the interaction is for the local population—as might happen more frequently in rural areas—the more negative impact on attitudes toward refugees. In sum, higher exposure to refugees will only translate into better attitudes and higher social cohesion in more cooperative and integrative contexts where there are opportunities of long-term meaningful interactions, while short-term and more distant exposure in segregated environments can lead to further inter-group tensions and animosity.¹²

In order to analyze the extent of inter-group relations in Lebanon and the role of contact and interactions, we use the Living Condition Survey of Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon (LCSRHCL), which was conducted by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies and the Syrian Center for Policy Research in 2018. The LCSRHCL is an extensive survey covering 1,556 households and 7,208 individuals (2,882 Lebanese and 4,326 Syrians) representative of the population in three Lebanese municipalities: Saida, Zahle, and Halba.¹³ We selected these municipalities because they all host a large number of refugees, but also because they have quite different characteristics in terms of location, level of development, religion composition, institutional structure, and stance vis-à-vis refugees—factors that shape the level of social cohesion.

Do Lebanese and Syrians Socially Interact with Each Other and in What Circumstances?

The LCSRHCL (2018) survey offers a valuable picture of the extent of social interactions between Lebanese and Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The survey covered three municipalities with large refugee populations. Based on our fieldwork for the survey sampling, we estimate the ratio of Syrian refugees to Lebanese to be 18% in Saida (approximately 14,000 Syrians compared to 77,000 Lebanese), 72% in Zahle (36,000 compared to 51,000), and 139% in Halba (8,000 compared to 6,000). Despite the large presence of refugees in these areas, a sizable portion of the two communities—particularly the Lebanese—report not interacting with each other with any frequency. About two in three Lebanese do not engage with Syrians in these three

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Dustmann, C., K. Vasiljeva, and A. P. Damm. 2019. 'Refugee Migration and Electoral Outcomes.' *The Review of Economic Studies*, 86(5): 2035-2091; Hangartner, D., E. Dinas, M. Marbach, K. Matakos, and D. Xefteris. 2019. 'Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?' *American Political Science Review*, 113(2): 442-455; Gessler, T., G. Tóth and J. Wachs. 2019. 'No Country for Asylum Seekers? How Short-Term Exposure to Refugees Influences Attitudes and Voting Behavior in Hungary.'

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Vertier, P. and M. Viskanic. 2019. 'Dismantling the 'Jungle': Migrant Relocation and Extreme Voting in France'; and Steinmayr, A. 2016. 'Exposure to Refugees and Voting for the Dar-Right: (Unexpected) Results from Austria.' IZA discussion paper.

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Alrababa'h, A., A. Dillon, S. Williamson, J. Hainmueller, D. Hangartner, and J. M. Weinstein. 2019. 'Attitudes Toward Migrants in a Highly-Impacted Economy: Evidence from the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan.' IPL Working Paper Series, No. 19-01.

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Uslaner, E. M. 2011. 'Trust, Diversity, and Segregation in the United States and the United Kingdom.' *Comparative Sociology*, 10 (2): 221-247.

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We limited the scope to three municipalities in order to be able to cover a representative sample of the population in each municipality and provide meaningful results at the local level, prioritizing depth at the expense of breadth.

Despite the large presence of refugees in these areas, a sizable portion of the two communities—particularly the Lebanese—report not interacting with each other with any frequency

localities, compared to one in three Syrians (figure 1.a). The prevalence of inter-group interactions for Syrian families is quite similar across the three municipalities, while it varies for host communities. In the Sunni majority cities of Halba and Saida, close to half of the population report engaging with refugees compared to less than 20% in Zahle, whose population is Christian in majority.


The type of interactions also varies across communities and municipalities (figure 1.b). Syrians report the largest interactions with Lebanese in economic transactions such as renting apartments and purchasing or selling goods, while those inter-group interactions are almost non-existent among Lebanese families. This might be due to a small fraction of Lebanese, who are either owners, sellers, or employers, that interact with the majority of Syrians. Conversely, Lebanese report social visits as the main form of interactions with the Syrian community, which is the highest in the more mixed city of Halba where inter-group ties precede the refugee crisis, and the least in Zahle. Therefore, the larger out-group exposure of Syrians compared to Lebanese is related to economic transactions and, when reduced to social interactions such as social visits and religious events, the share of interactions is similarly low for both groups. In general, there is a very low correlation between the different types of interactions, as those that have economic interactions with the other group are not more likely to socially interact with them.

Figure 1


Interactions between the two communities and types by municipality

a

Interactions between the Lebanese and Syrian communities



b Types of interactions between the communities



Source: LCSRHCL (2018).

Interestingly, variations in inter-group interactions across municipalities are not always correlated with the size of the refugee influx. For example, in the city of Zahle and its immediate surroundings, where we estimate there are about seven refugees for every 10 Lebanese, Lebanese interact the least with Syrians. On the other hand, in Saida, where there are less than two refugees for every 10 Lebanese, the prevalence of inter-group interactions for the host population more than doubles, reaching 42%. Therefore, host communities do not interact


with refugees purely based on exposure, but also due to other factors as well, such as the level of segregation between the two communities. Figure 2 shows the physical distance between the

Host communities do not interact with refugees purely based on exposure, but also due to other factors as well, such as the level of segregation between the two communities

location of Syrian families' homes to the closest Lebanese household in the three municipalities (as percentage of the total Syrian population in each municipality). We can see how in Halba, Syrians are highly integrated within the Lebanese community, and nearly all of the population lives within 0.5 kilometers of a Lebanese family home. In comparison, only 20% of Syrians in Zahle live within 0.5 kilometers of a Lebanese family and about 20% live more than 2 kilometers away. The average distance to the closest Lebanese home rises from 0.06 kilometers in Halba, to 0.53 kilometers in Saida and 1.25 kilometers in Zahle, where there is a more entrenched segregation between the two communities.

Figure 2

Physical distance between Syrian families and the closest Lebanese household (in kilometers)



Source [LC SRHCL \(2018\)](#).

In order to further understand which Syrian and Lebanese families are more likely to interact with each other, we use a multivariate analysis with a series of individual and regional explanatory variables (age, education, sect, employment status, income, vulnerability indicators, and physical distance to the nearest out-group family) on the probability of a given household to interact with members of the other community. Annex 1 provides the main regression results for the Syrian and Lebanese households separately.

Education levels and income are key drivers of social interactions, although they display a different pattern for each group. On the one hand, more educated Syrians are more likely to engage with Lebanese households, with an increased chance of 1.6% for every additional year of education of the head of the household. Comparing two Syrian families with otherwise similar

Education levels and income are key drivers of social interactions

characteristics would show that one with the head of the household having finished secondary school would be close to 20% more likely to interact with Lebanese families than a family where the household head has no education. On the other hand, the effect is the opposite for Lebanese families, for whom the more education adults have, the less likely they are to socialize with Syrians. For this group, we also observed that the richest families in the top three deciles of income are about 11% less likely to interact with Syrians. Overall, the results portray a picture of a social hierarchy in line with the economic

levels, where rich Lebanese sit at the top, the poorest Syrians at the bottom, with poorer Lebanese and richer Syrians in the middle as the most likely to interact with each other.

In a similar vein, there are specific vulnerabilities that provide cues of the socioeconomic situation of a household and that are strongly correlated with the probability of interacting with members of the other community. In particular, Syrian families headed by a woman, which tend to be more vulnerable, are about 20% less likely to interact with Lebanese than Syrian families headed by a man, while the opposite is true for female-headed Lebanese households. In the case of Syrian families, we also find that those that were threatened with eviction are between 15% to 20% less likely to have social relations with Lebanese. These results again point toward the most vulnerable Lebanese and the least vulnerable Syrian being the main groups that interact with each other.

Beyond income and socioeconomic vulnerability, there are three other factors that determine inter-group connections. First, physical distance is a key barrier for interaction for both communities. For every additional kilometer of distance to the closest out-group family, the chances of interactions are reduced by 8% for Syrians and 20% for Lebanese, even after controlling for all other socioeconomic and regional differences. Therefore, the more segregated the two communities are, the less likely they are to interact with each other. Secondly, different confessional groups of Lebanese, regardless of their location or socioeconomic status, are not equally likely to interact with Syrian refugees that, in our sampled municipalities, were almost entirely Sunni. In particular, Christian Lebanese families are about 25% less likely to interact with Syrian refugees compared to Sunni Lebanese. This religious divide is significant and drives the overall lower interactions in the Christian city of Zahle, although it is also observed among the minority of Christians in Halba. Finally, the education system provides a unique opportunity for Syrian families to engage with Lebanese networks. A household that has all the children enrolled in school is about 12% more likely to interact with Lebanese individuals than a similar one where none of its children is enrolled.

The education system provides a unique opportunity for Syrian families to engage with Lebanese networks


14
World Bank. 2019. 'Behavioral
Strategies to Support Social
Stability in Lebanon.'
Washington DC.

Attitudes Toward Out-Group Members and the Role of Interactions

Attitudes toward other communities are the basis of social cohesion between groups and provide important hints on the extent of social stability in Lebanon. As observed in previous studies, inter-group hostilities in Lebanon are latent but there are risks of escalations.¹⁴ The LCSRHCL (2018) measures attitudes toward the out-group by asking citizens about their perceptions of their relations with the other community on a scale of five, ranging from very bad to very good. As figure 3 shows, Lebanese tend to report more neutral or no relations, while Syrians are more likely to claim they have more positive relationships. While overt dislike or negative relations are not frequently reported, this might be due to response biases. Even with these biases, a sizable minority of Syrians in Zahle and Saida stated having poor relations with the Lebanese community. When focusing exclusively on those that report good relations, we find a similar prevalence among Syrians in each of the three municipalities but large variations for Lebanese. In line with the previous analysis of social interactions, the Lebanese population is significantly less likely to report good relations with Syrians in Zahle (21%), than in Halba (53%) and Saida (44%). Overall, while explicit animosity is not prevalent, only a minority of Lebanese have good relations with Syrian refugees which are necessary for strengthening social cohesion in the country.

Figure 3

Attitudes and relations with the other community




Source LCSRHCL (2018).

Given the presence of inter-group tensions, the availability of dispute resolution mechanisms for both communities is an essential component for social cohesion. However, the LCSRHCL (2018) shows strikingly low availability of formal and informal mechanisms to settle inter-communal tensions (figure 4). In the three municipalities, about 53% of Lebanese and 61% of Syrians report not having a single proper mechanism to settle inter-group disputes when needed. Furthermore, when they do have one, many Syrians seek informal networks like local leaders (known as *mukhtars*) or NGOs to fill the vacuum of formal institutions, while Lebanese are the ones relying on formal institutions such as General Security and courts. There are also important variations across localities. For example, almost all Lebanese in Zahle would engage with the General Security, suggesting a high trust in and accessibility to this institution. In Halba, informal institutions seem to be more prevalent, in particular *mukhtars*, that play the role of dispute resolution for about 15% of Lebanese and Syrian families.

Figure 4

Dispute resolution mechanisms between the Lebanese and Syrian communities




Source: LCSRHCL (2018).

In line with the contact theory, we observe that families that interact with the other community have, on average, significantly better attitudes toward each other (figure 5). However, it is important to notice that not all types of interactions lead to more positive views. In general, social visits are associated with more positive feelings between the two communities, for both Lebanese and Syrians. On the other hand, we find that economic interactions such as engaging in purchases and selling of goods or rent, do not improve attitudes toward the out-group and, in many cases, can even worsen them. When Lebanese and Syrians interact in the workplace, there are strikingly different effects on attitudes, with Lebanese improving their views on Syrians while Syrians either have similar or more negative attitudes toward Lebanese.

Figure 5

Social interactions and attitudes toward the other community



Source [LCPSRHCL \(2018\)](#).

Note 95% confidence intervals are included to assess whether the differences are statistically significant. The scale of attitudes toward the other community goes from 2 (very negative attitudes) to 5 (very positive attitudes).

Similar to the study of inter-group interactions, we use multivariate regressions to assess the main drivers of attitudes of each of the two communities toward the other based on socioeconomic characteristics of individuals and municipal specificities (models 5 and 8 of annex 2), as well as including geographical proximity as a proxy for the likelihood of interactions (models 6 and 9 of annex 2) or different direct measures of social and economic interactions (models 7 and 10 of annex 2).

When looking at households' socioeconomic specificities, we find that, compared to poor families, Syrians in the middle-income brackets or those where the head is employed, show more positive attitudes toward Lebanese than low-income Syrians. Furthermore, less legally and socially vulnerable families such as those with residency permits or those headed by a man tend to better rate their relations with Lebanese. These findings are robust when controlling for differences in levels of family interactions with Lebanese, showing that better economic, social, and security conditions of Syrians have a positive effect on their attitudes toward Lebanese. The enrollment of Syrian children in Lebanese schools, on the other hand, while increasing the opportunities for interactions between the communities, does not seem to improve attitudes toward the other group. This is aligned with previous research that shows that, while relations between students in mixed classes in Lebanon improve over time, they do not translate into closer relationships outside of school or into better attitudes of family members.¹⁵

In turn, Lebanese attitudes toward Syrians seem to mostly be shaped by sectarian and safety perceptions, rather than purely economic considerations.

Christian families in both Zahle and Halba have worse opinions about Syrians than Sunnis or Shias, even when controlling for their lower likelihood of interaction with them. This points

toward a central role of historical sectarian grievances that have accumulated over many years, in particular during the prolonged political and military Syrian occupation of Lebanon until 2005. Perceptions of insecurity—regardless of how real the threat is—are another key issue, as there is a strong positive correlation between how safe a Lebanese family feels and how they perceive Syrians, which illustrates the concerns of Lebanese about becoming victims of higher rates of crime.¹⁶ This finding is in line with the 'safety theory' that emphasizes the channel of fear for safety derived from the arrival of refugees. Refugees are often blamed in the media and political discourses for the rise in criminality and citizens might have worse attitudes toward them due to fear, independent of whether or not those claims have any real

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Abla, Z. and M. Al-Masri. 2015. 'Better Together: The Impact of the Schooling System of Lebanese and Syrian Displaced Pupils on Social Mobility.' International Alert.

Lebanese attitudes toward Syrians seem to mostly be shaped by sectarian and safety perceptions, rather than purely economic considerations

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This result is similar to previous studies on this topic in Lebanon, such as: International Alert. 2015. 'Citizens' Perceptions of Security Threats Stemming from the Syrian Refugee Presence in Lebanon.'

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Rustenbach, E. 2010. 'Sources of Negative Attitudes Towards Immigrants in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis.' *International Migration Review*, 44(1): 53-77;
Chandler, C. R. and Y. Tsai. 2001. 'Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey.' *Social Science Journal*, 38(2): 177-88.

18
World Bank. 2019. 'Behavioral Strategies to Support Social Stability in Lebanon.' Washington, DC; and UNDP. 2017. 'Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon.'

19
According to LCRP (2018), there were over 50 protests and/or municipal restrictions reported in the first half of 2017.

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Refugees' settlement and physical closeness to Lebanese households, although not random, might be argued as not being mainly decided by how good the relations with Lebanese were, but rather by socioeconomic factors that we can control for. For Lebanese, their attitudes toward Syrians might be even more orthogonal to the decision of Syrians where to settle.

foundation.¹⁷ Income considerations are less apparent, although results show that richer families have a more positive stance toward Syrian refugees when controlling for their lower interaction. This might be due to a higher presence of inter-group economic competition for low-skilled jobs that has been suggested in past studies¹⁸ and that has already led to sporadic episodes of unrest and protests targeting Syrian workers' shops.¹⁹

Similar to results shown in figure 5, even after we control for the different characteristics that lead families to be more or less likely to engage with households from the other community, inter-group interactions, in particular in different social settings rather than economic transactions, lead to better attitudes toward the out-group for both Lebanese and Syrians (models 7 and 10 of annex 2). This finding might suffer from reverse causality, as those with better attitudes to the other community might be more willing to interact with them. In order to mitigate this issue, we use the distance to the nearest member of the other community as a more exogenous proxy of social interactions (models 6 and 9 of annex 2).²⁰ In this case, physical distance, which reduces interactions between the two communities, worsens the attitudes of Lebanese toward Syrian refugees, while it does not significantly affect those of Syrians. This result provides suggestive evidence that, beyond macro considerations of economic competition and fear of sectarian imbalances, Lebanese families that live closer to Syrians and engage in more social interactions with them are more empathetic and have better opinions about them.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Given the context of rising inter-group tensions since the Syrian refugee crisis, maintaining social cohesion is a priority in Lebanon. Although overt hostilities are not common, there is only a minority of Lebanese that consider themselves as having good relations with refugees. Another striking fact is that, even in localities with a high presence of refugees, there is only a minority of the host community that interacts with Syrians. In relation to that, certain municipalities like Zahle suffer from high levels of segregation that actually hinder the emergence of those interactions.

Past evidence shows that contact with outside groups, when done in a more cooperative environment and with opportunities for long-term meaningful interactions, can be positive for inter-group empathy and perceptions, thus promoting social cohesion. In the Lebanese context, we observe that, although limited, physical proximity and social interactions with refugees actually improve Lebanese perceptions of Syrians.

Moving from competition toward a cooperative environment requires continued investments from the government and the international community in local economies with the largest concentration of refugees, benefiting

both communities, economically and socially. When sectarian grievances are more entrenched, there is a need for further strengthening the social dialogue and for providing the necessary dispute resolution mechanisms that seem to be currently insufficient in Lebanon. Although requiring initial investments, moving from segregation to more inclusive environments can have large dividends to the stability of the country, in particular given the economic and political crisis that the country has been immersed in since 2019.

Annex 1

Determinants of Social Interactions Among Communities

Variables	Model 1 Percentage of Syrians that interact with Lebanese	Model 2 Percentage of Lebanese that interact with Syrians	Model 3 Percentage of Syrians that interact with Lebanese and distance	Model 4 Percentage of Lebanese that interact with Syrians and distance
Household size	-0.001 (0.001)	0.013 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.012 (0.019)
Female household head	-0.189*** (0.065)	0.132** (0.064)	-0.215*** (0.068)	0.124* (0.064)
Years of school for household head	0.016** (0.007)	-0.013* (0.007)	0.010 (0.008)	-0.013* (0.007)
Residency permits	-0.021 (0.048)		-0.030 (0.049)	
Christian		-0.248*** (0.077)		-0.307*** (0.076)
Shia		0.121 (0.091)		0.146 (0.093)
Percentage of children enrolled	0.122** (0.052)	0.018 (0.057)	0.129** (0.054)	0.026 (0.058)
Eviction threat	-0.149*** (0.061)	0.106 (0.172)	-0.189*** (0.062)	0.102 (0.171)
Household head employed	-0.066 (0.052)	0.046 (0.063)	-0.080 (0.052)	0.037 (0.063)
Medium income	0.029 (0.078)	-0.060 (0.070)	0.045 (0.090)	-0.058 (0.070)
High income		-0.111* (0.074)		-0.113* (0.078)
Halba	0.111** (0.045)	0.018 (0.055)	0.045 (0.053)	0.041 (0.058)
Zahle	0.160*** (0.057)	0.017 (0.087)	0.188*** (0.061)	0.099 (0.093)
Distance to out-group			-0.082*** (0.028)	-0.201** (0.092)

Variables	Model 1 Percentage of Syrians that interact with Lebanese	Model 2 Percentage of Lebanese that interact with Syrians	Model 3 Percentage of Syrians that interact with Lebanese and distance	Model 4 Percentage of Lebanese that interact with Syrians and distance
Observations	687	676	633	675
R-squared	0.059	0.093	0.069	0.099

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Annex 2

Determinants of Attitudes Toward the Other Community

Variables	Model 5 Positive attitude toward Lebanese	Model 6 Positive attitude toward Lebanese and distance	Model 7 Positive attitude toward Lebanese and interaction	Model 8 Positive attitude toward Syrians	Model 9 Positive attitude toward Syrians and distance	Model 10 Positive attitude toward Syrians and interaction
Household size	0.005 (0.010)	0.005 (0.012)	0.002 (0.010)	0.027 (0.019)	0.028 (0.019)	0.055** (0.028)
Female household head	-0.166** (0.067)	-0.212*** (0.070)	-0.134* (0.074)	0.162** (0.065)	0.158** (0.065)	0.094 (0.106)
Years of school for household head	0.013 (0.008)	0.011 (0.009)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.010 (0.007)	0.005 (0.011)
Residency permits	0.233*** (0.052)	0.242*** (0.054)	0.231*** (0.052)			
Christian				-0.278*** (0.080)	-0.299*** (0.083)	-0.224 (0.154)
Shia				0.041 (0.091)	0.074 (0.095)	-0.135 (0.150)
Percentage children enrolled	-0.034 (0.060)	-0.037 (0.064)	-0.048 (0.062)	0.032 (0.058)	0.036 (0.059)	0.076 (0.085)
Eviction threat	-0.050 (0.063)	-0.037 (0.064)	-0.023 (0.064)	-0.050 (0.153)	-0.054 (0.153)	-0.107 (0.162)
Household head employed	-0.096* (0.057)	-0.107* (0.060)	-0.146** (0.060)	0.095 (0.064)	0.091 (0.064)	0.231*** (0.084)
Medium income	0.177** (0.077)	0.262*** (0.071)	0.174** (0.076)	-0.015 (0.073)	-0.020 (0.073)	0.380*** (0.082)
High income				-0.031 (0.083)	-0.029 (0.084)	0.492*** (0.111)
Mobility restrictions	-0.040 (0.052)	-0.054 (0.056)	-0.033 (0.055)	0.051 (0.137)	0.049 (0.137)	0.024 (0.285)
Safety perceptions	0.057* (0.032)	0.057* (0.034)	0.055 (0.035)	0.117*** (0.042)	0.121*** (0.042)	0.193*** (0.066)
Halba	0.068 (0.056)	0.084 (0.061)	0.073 (0.063)	0.018 (0.063)	0.030 (0.065)	0.097 (0.120)
Zahle	0.160** (0.068)	0.202*** (0.073)	0.149** (0.069)	0.014 (0.092)	0.050 (0.099)	-0.116 (0.154)

Variables	Model 5 Positive attitude toward Lebanese	Model 6 Positive attitude toward Lebanese and distance	Model 7 Positive attitude toward Lebanese and interaction	Model 8 Positive attitude toward Syrians	Model 9 Positive attitude toward Syrians and distance	Model 10 Positive attitude toward Syrians and interaction
Distance to out-group		-0.015 (0.033)			-0.172* (0.109)	
Social visits			0.297*** (0.047)			0.953*** (0.011)
Religious events			0.029 (0.068)			
Work with out-group			0.137** (0.061)			
Purchases			-0.109 (0.067)			
Rent with out-group			0.225*** (0.054)			
Observations	671	598	652	672	664	648
R-squared	0.067	0.075	0.140	0.098	0.102	0.737

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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About the author

Daniel Garrote Sánchez contributed to this project while being a senior researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. He currently works as a labor market consultant at the World Bank. His areas of work include economic migration, labor markets and the task content of jobs, conflict and forced displacement, and development of lagging regions. Prior to joining LCPS, he served as a labor migration consultant for the World Bank and the Ministry of Labor of Saudi Arabia. He also worked for six years as an economic researcher at the Central Bank of Spain covering a range of macroeconomic topics such as fiscal policy, labor markets, and deleveraging. Garrote Sánchez holds a master's degree in Public Administration and International Development from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.

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Contact Information Lebanese Center for Policy Studies

Sadat Tower, Tenth floor
P.O.B 55-215, Leon Street,
Ras Beirut, Lebanon
T: + 961 1 799301
F: + 961 1 799302
info@lcps-lebanon.org
www.lcps-lebanon.org